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The Attorney's Affidavit in Litigation
Proceedings
John H. Garvey*
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO ATTORNEY AFFIDAVITS
Although until the early 1800's Anglo-American law perceived no
impropriety in an attorney testifying for his client,' the accepted
learning in this country for more than a century has been that coun-
sel may legitimately act as both advocate and witness in the same
case only in unusual circumstances. 2 Yet despite the general prohibi-
tion on live testimony by counsel, attorneys commonly file their own
affidavits in their clients' behalf at various stages of the litigation pro-
ceedings. The question of attorney affidavits surfaces very rarely in
reported judicial opinions,' since the practice occurs most frequently
in connection with motions seeking or opposing some form of inter-
locutory relief. More curious is the complete absence of scholarly dis-
cussion of such activity, which presents complex questions of
professional responsibility and attorney work product. This article
addresses those issues and suggests criteria by which both courts and
counsel may evaluate the professional propriety and legal conse-
quences of attorney affidavits.
As might be'expected, an attorney's choice to proceed on his own,
rather than another's, affidavit is one which occurs with less fre-
quency as the distance from trial decreases. Statements by counsel
are best accepted and most permissible for purely formal and non-
controversial purposes related to the initiation of lawsuits, such as
* A.B. 1970, University of Notre Dame; J.D. 1974, Harvard University. Assistant Pro-
fessor of Law, Kentucky College of Law.
1. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1911, at 774 (Chadbourne rev. 1976).
2. E.g., ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, DR 5-102: "If, after undertak-
ing employment in contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he
or a lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a witness on behalf of his client, he shall withdraw
from the conduct of the trial and his firm, if any, shall not continue representation in the trial
.... " Se id EC 5-9 & 5-10, DR 5-101. See generall' 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1911.
3. Se note 7 infra.
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attesting to the lawyer's role as legal guardian, executor, or adminis-
trator,4 or verification of pleadings in behalf of a client. Though
most jurisdictions prefer verification by a party, counsel's verification
is widely authorized by statute5 and contemplated by the Code of
Professional Responsibility.6
The discovery process also lends itself to frequent intervention by
counsel in the role of participant. Some affidavits, however, relate
merely to "formal" matters, which cannot await presentation at trial
or be addressed by normal witnesses, and will seldom raise ethical
and work product issues. An attorney may file an affidavit concern-
ing his own conduct in discovery matters, or the conduct of the par-
ties or opposing counsel." For example, when a party seeks discovery
of documents which may be in the possession of counsel for the re-
4. See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 11.
5. Although verification has lost most of its significance in the wake of procedural re-
form, it continues to be permitted-and occasionally even required-under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and many state statutory schemes. See, e.g., FED. R. Clv. P. 11; ALA. R.
CIV. P. 11; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 446 (West Supp. 1978); COLO. R. Civ. P. 11; FLA. R.
Clv. P. 1.03g; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 35 (Smith-Hurd 1968); LA. CODE CIV. PRO. ANN.
art. 863 (West 1961); MASS. R. Civ. P. 11; MICH. GENERAL CT. R. 114; MINN. R. CIV. P. 11;
N.J. R. CT. 1:4-7; N.Y. CIV. PRAC. § 3020(d); N.D. R. Civ. P. 11; OHIO R. CIV. P. 11; OR.
REV. STAT. § 16.070 (1977); PA. R. Civ. P. 1024; WASH. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 11; Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 802.05 (West 1977); WYO. R. CrV. P. 11. The general preference for verification by
the party is most easily overcome when the party resides outside the county where the attor-
ney has his office, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 446 (West Supp. 1978); MD. R. PROC. 303, § b(3)
(party absent from state); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-3702 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 15.010 (1977); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. § 3020(d); OR. REV. STAT. § 16.070 (1977); PA. R. Civ. P.
1024(c) (party outside jurisdiction and verification cannot be obtained in time for filing); S.C.
CODE § 15-13-40 (1977), or is for some cause not able to execute the verification, CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 446 (West Supp. 1978); MD. R. PROC. 303, § b(3); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§ 93-3702 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 15.010 (1977); OR. REV. STAT. § 16.070 (1977); S.C.
CODE § 15-13-40 (1977). Counsel may also be permitted to verify where the action or defense
is based on a written instrument for the payment of money, which is in counsel's possession,
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 3020(d); N.C. R. Civ. P. § 1A-1, Rule 11(c); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 16.070 (1977); S.C. CODE § 15-13-40 (1977); see TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-703 (1955), or
where the lawyer has personal knowledge of the facts on which the pleading is based, CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE § 446 (West Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 35 (Smith-Hurd
1968); MICH. GENERAL CT. R. 114.3; NEV. REV. STAT. § 15.010 (1977); N.Y. CIV. PRAC.
§ 3020(d); N.C. R. Civ. P. § IA-I, Rule 1(c); OR. REV. STAT. § 16.070 (1977); S.C. CODE
§ 15-13-40 (1977), and in some cases, with no restrictions at all, ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (any
person "acquainted with the facts); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1107 (1962); IND. CODE
§ 34-5-1-1, Trial Rule 11(c) (1976) ("reasonable cause to believe" matters therein); WYO. R.
CIv. P. 11(b).
6. Set ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-25 ("[A] lawyer should sub-
scribe to or verify only those pleadings that he believes are in compliance with applicable law
and rules.... 2).
7. Such an affidavit parallels an attorney's description under oath of the unsuccessful
steps he has taken to obtain information which opposing counsel holds, as part of a showing
of hardship under FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) in a motion for production. Or counsel may
support a motion for a protective order under FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c) by stating under oath
[Vol. 31:191
January 1979] ATTORNEY AFFIDAVITS
sponding party, it may be not only proper but even necessary for the
responding attorney to state by way of affidavit that the materials are
no longer in existence, or have been mislaid, since he may be the only
person with first-hand knowledge of those facts.8 As the agent of the
responding party he may have a duty to produce the documents, ab-
sent any work product protection.9 Furthermore, when a party seeks
sanctions for the opposition's failure to make discovery, the court is
likely to be interested in learning what the opposing attorney's ac-
tions have been, since the nature of an appropriate order will often
turn on the willfulness of the party's refusal to cooperate.1 0
But serious ethical and work product questions do arise when
counsel files an affidavit regarding the merits of the litigation or the
that he cannot attend a deposition at a certain time because of an unforeseen emergency and
asking that the session be postponed.
Affidavits filed by counsel going to such matters as the propriety of service of process also
present no problems of the kind dealt with here. See, e.g., Bucholz v. Hutton, 153 F. Supp. 62
(D. Mont. 1957); f. Agrio v. Oceanic Operations Corp., 204 F. Supp. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
(affidavit of counsel for plaintiff arguing existence of subject matter jurisdiction in Jones Act
case); De Sairigne v. Gould, 83 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (forum non conveniens, where
defendant resided in France and was unable to travel to the United States). Although it may
sometimes happen that the question ofjurisdiction or service of process is inextricably bound
up with the merits of the controversy, see Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark.
1959), most typically statements by counsel regarding such matters will have no spillover
effect: beyond the determination of a narrow preliminary question. And in questions of per-
sonal jurisdiction it may happen that counsel is the only one around.
8. See, e.g., Jensen v. Boston Ins. Co., 20 F.R.D. 619 (N.D. Cal. 1957). In Jensen, a
motion for production under Rule 34 was "supported by an affidavit of defendant's counsel
in which it is sworn on information and belief that the documents are in the possession or
under the custody of the third party defendants; that the documents must be produced in
order for defendant to conduct its cross-examination of its opponents; and that the documents
are 'material and necessary to the completion of the investigation of the defense of the action
on such complaint and to proving the action under said third party complaint.' Defendant's
counsel further swears that [the third party defendant] refused to produce the documents
after being requested to do so by the affiant. . . ." Id. at 621. The third party defendant
claimed orally that the documents were no longer in existence, to which claim the court
replied that "if the documents sought are not in existence, it is incumbent upon the objecting
party or parties to so state under oath and not by way of a general unverified allegation." Id.
For a recent example of the gravity of the duty imposed on counsel in such circum-
stances, note the stir created by Kodak's defense of an antitrust suit by Berkey Photo Inc.
when Mahlon Perkins, an attorney who had handled part of Kodak's discovery, filed an affi-
davit stating that he had discarded certain documents which in fact had been retained. Wall
St. J., Mar. 30, 1978, at 8, col. 1.
9. "Any party may serve on any other party a request (1) to produce. . . documents
. . . which are in the possession, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is
served . . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a); see In re Ruppert, 309 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1962); 8 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2210 (1970).
10. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639
(1976) (per curiam); Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery
Sanctions, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1033 (1978).
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facts and issues in controversy, and thereby becomes a quasi-witness,
offering information with respect to substance rather than process.
This information generally could be put forward by other means, as
it would be at trial, and thus an attorney bears a heavy burden in
justifying such an affidavit. For example, suppose that in the course
of discovery counsel wishes to expedite the schedule for depositions,
responses to interrogatories, production of documents, or requests for
admissions." The attorney may state by way of affidavit, and on in-
formation and belief, that his client will suffer irreparable harm from
the defendant's actions if the proceedings are not concluded with all
possible haste, and include in the affidavit his sources of information
and grounds for belief. 2 To be sure, the order being sought is techni-
cally procedural, and does not in any way determine the ultimate
outcome of the case. But by offering under oath his views on the
substance of the controversy the attorney has become a participant in
the litigation in a way not normally contemplated for attorneys, hav-
ing given fact or belief which might well have been provided from
another source. Clearly, if the court gives weight to the attorney's
statements and orders expedition, the opposing party may suffer
from being given less time to hire a lawyer and prepare to respond.
The issue thus offers more than academic interest.
Counsel may also offer his own affidavit in connection with appli-
cations for preliminary injunctions or temporary restraining orders,' 3
proceedings in which the strict evidentiary standards associated with
motions for summary judgment 4 apparently give way to the need for
11. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a) ("Leave of court. . . must be obtained. . . if the plaintiff
seeks to take a deposition prior to the expiration of 30 days after service of the summons and
complaint upon any defendant . . . .'); FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a) ("The court may allow a
shorter. . . time [for filing responses to interrogatories]."); FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b) ("The court
may allow a shorter. . . time [for response to a request for production of documents].'); FED.
R. Civ. P. 36(a) ("[U]nless the court shortens the time, a defendant shall not be required to
serve answers or objections [to a request for admission] before the expiration of 45 days after
service of the summons and complaint on him.').
12. Suppose, to be a little more concrete, that company A, seeking by means of a lawsuit
to avoid a takeover by company B, desires expedited discovery so that the merits may be
resolved before a tender offer is made. Given the extreme time pressures which characterize
tender offers, A's attorney may well file his own affidavit in support of such a motion, and in
it state on information and belief the deleterious consequences which would result to A from
the takeover. The harm alleged could be the very basis for A's claim for equitable relief on
the merits as well.
13. FED. R. Qv. P. 65(b).
14. The rule on summary judgment, FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e), provides that "[s]upporting
and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein."
[Vol. 31:191
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speedy relief.15 When there is no real dispute as to material facts,'
6
or when other circumstances appeal to the discretion of the trial
judge,' 7 a temporary injunction may issue on the basis of affidavits,
one or more of which may come from an attorney.' 8 Such an affida-
15. Unlike Rule 56, see note 14 supra, the rule on injunctions, FED. R. Civ. P. 65, does
not require that an affidavit "set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence." First,
because it does not ordinarily dispose of the case on the merits, interlocutory injunctive relief
has a less drastic impact than summary judgment. Moreover, the party enjoined may protect
itself either by posting security, or, where necessary, obtaining dissolution of the order before
trial. Perhaps most important, on motions for injunctive relief the parties may find it impossi-
ble to marshal adequate admissible evidence within the time framework contemplated by the
rules. 7 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 65.04[3], at 65-64 (2d ed. 1978); see Wounded Knee
Legal Defense/Offense Comm. v. FBI, 507 F.2d 1281, 1286-87 (8th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Gen-
eral Refractories Co., 400 F. Supp. 1248, 1255 (D.D.C. 1975). "Finally, inasmuch as the grant
of a preliminary injunction is discretionary, the trial court should be allowed to give even
inadmissible evidence some weight when it is thought advisable to do so in order to serve the
primary purpose of preventing irreparable harm before a trial can be had." 11 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2949, at 471.
16. Compare K-2 Ski Co. v. Head Ski Co., 467 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1972), with Safeway
Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Properties, Inc., 307 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1962). In Safeway, the court
observed that "the granting of a preliminary injunction is within the sound discretion of the
trial court. . . . It appears to us that there is little genuine controversy as to the basic facts
.... Accordingly, the rights of the parties were well enough established by the affidavits and
pleadings for the trial court in its discretion to issue the preliminary injunction." Id. at 500.
In K-2 Ski Co., after noting that a preliminary injunction might properly be based on affida-
vits, the court warned that "if the facts so appearing consist largely of general assertions
which are substantially controverted by counter-affidavits, a court should not grant such re-
lief unless the moving party makes a further showing sufficient to demonstrate that he will
probably succeed on the merits." 467 F.2d at 1088-89.
17. See SEC v. Koenig, 469 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 1972) (continued violations of securi-
ties laws and failure to correct errors in SEC filings and press releases); San Francisco-Oak-
land Newspaper Guild v. Kennedy, 412 F.2d 541, 546 (9th Cir. 1969) (reasonable cause to
believe unfair labor practices being committed); Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith, Kline &
French Laboratories, 207 F.2d 190, 198 (2d Cir. 1953) (danger of "irreparable injury" if no
speedy relief, though bond posted to protect enjoined party); SEC v. General Refractories
Co., 400 F. Supp. 1248 (D.D.C. 1975) (showing of need sufficient for injunction against SEC
violation if evidence not in dispute).
18. Many of the attorneys filing affidavits in connection with preliminary injunction
requests are associated with government regulatory agencies, a fact which obscures the study
of attorney affidavit practice in two ways.
First, an attorney for an agency such as the SEC may possess detailed knowledge of the
facts and issues stated in his affidavit, because of his knowledge of the field, his work in inves-
tigating the matter, and his access to a vast body of specialized information within the
agency. The fact that he is also an attorney may be quite incidental to the affidavit's role in
the injunction proceeding.
Second, government attorneys may be favored by statutes which, in the language of
many preliminary injunction opinions, effectively "tip the scales" in favor of preliminary in-
junctions. See, e.g., FTC v. Sterling Drugs, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 678 (2d Cir. 1963); FTC v.
Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 191 F.2d 744, 747 (7th Cir. 1951) (congressional intent to relax nor-
mal equitable standards for the granting of injunctive relief found in language of § 13(a) of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(9) (1976)). Thus, when a court grants a
January 1979]
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vit adds a substantial dimension to counsel's participation in litiga-
tion and may cause severe detriment to the opposing party.' 9
Opinions dealing with motions for summary judgment,2 ° perhaps
simply because they are most often reported, indicate most clearly
the frequency with which counsel attempts to take an active role in
the litigation through the filing of an affidavit. The requirements for
affidavits in support of a motion for summary judgment are strict,
2 '
and so counsel's affidavit may only in limited instances affect the out-
come of the motion. 22 But these requirements do not seem to deter
attorneys from filing such affidavits when they feel they have ac-
quired knowledge in the course of preparing for a case which renders
them especially competent to testify to particular facts. For example,
counsel who has studied the operation of a machine in an action for
patent infringement may offer his statement in order to defend on
the basis of anticipation by prior art.23 In other cases, the attorney
preliminary injunction on the basis of affidavits filed by government attorneys, it is difficult to
tell whether the court would have accorded similar respect to a private attorney's affidavit.
Yet some private counsel have the same depth of knowledge with respect to their clients that
a government agency attorney might have in his particular field, especially a private corpo-
rate counsel with a long-standing relationship to the corporation.
19. The more severe the detriment, however, the more likely it is that the court will
resort to additional methods of factfinding-including an-evidentiary hearing-before grant-
ing injunctive relief. Se SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 490-93 (2d Cir. 1968); Sims v. Greene,
161 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1947). FED. R. CIv. P. 65(a)(2) provides that "the court may order the
trial of the action on the merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the
application [for preliminary injunction]." With such a wide range of discretion available, a
court's use of attorney affidavits in granting or denying an injunction order would depend
heavily on the particular circumstances of the case.
20. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
21. "Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
22. Courts frequently refuse to consider attorney affidavits on the ground that counsel
has ignored the personal knowledge requirement of FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e). E.g., Automatic
Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950); Bumgarner v. Joe Brown
Co., 376 F.2d 749 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967); Local 490, United Rubber
Workers v. Kirkhill Rubber Co., 367 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1966); F.S. Bowen Elec. Co. v. J.D.
Hedin Constr. Co., 316 F.2d 362 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Hoston v. J.R. Watkins Co., 300 F.2d 869
(9th Cir. 1962); Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 248 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1957);
Flintkote Co. v. United States, 47 F.R.D. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hut-
ton, 297 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Md. 1968), ajf'din part, rev'd in part on other groundr, 422 F.2d 1124
(4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974); Christophides v. Porco, 289 F. Supp. 403
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); Noth v. Scheurer, 285 F. Supp. 81 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Graham v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 13 Fed. R. Serv. 943 (S.D. Ohio 1949).
23. See Inglett & Co. v. Everglades Fertilizer Co., 255 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1958). In
Ingeti, counsel was sharply criticized for submitting "uncontroverted facts" in the form of
what was actually an argumentative affidavit. See J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1911(3), at
780; text accompanying notes 69-73 infia.
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may have heard an admission by an opposing party,24 or may as the
result of an investigation be able to demonstrate facts undisputed by
the other party.25 To the extent that a court looks to such an affida-
vit for support of a summary judgment motion, counsel becomes an
active participant in the determination of the merits.26
A final situation in which attorneys frequently file affidavits on
behalf of their clients is a motion for a new trial.27 The distinction
between counsel's statements simply related to his observation of the
litigation and those dealing with the substance of the controversy ap-
plies here as well. For example, motions for new trial based on
grounds appearing in the record-that there was error in admitting
evidence, or giving instructions, or that the verdict is against the law
or the weight of the evidence, or that the amount of an award is
excessive or inadequate-may be supported by an affidavit of coun-
sel which does no more than recite his recollection of events which
transpired in the course of trial.
But problems may arise when counsel seeks to substantiate a mo-
tion for new trial through facts outside the record-newly discovered
evidence,28 misconduct in the jury's deliberations,29 or misconduct of
24. See Douglas v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 334 F. Supp. 1166 (D. Alas. 1971), rev'd in part on
other grounds, 469 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1972) (affidavit by attorneys present at deposition report-
ing events at deposition).
25. See, e.g., Lula v. Sivaco Wire & Nail Co., 265 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). In Lu/a,
defendant's investigators learned that a mother claiming mental anguish had not been pres-
ent at the scene of an accident to see her child injured, a fact which the plaintiff did not
dispute. Defense counsel submitted this information in affidavit form. The court, observing
that "ordinarily such affidavits not made on personal knowledge would be insufficient on a
motion for summary judgment," was willing nonetheless to rule in the ease before it because
the situation was "clear." Id. at 224.
26. Once again it is necessary to distinguish situations in which counsel must offer his
evidence because he is a direct part of the controversy, as when an attorney in an action
asserts a claim for his fee, see, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Moore, 306 F. Supp.
1088 (N.D. Miss. 1969) (affidavits of attorney intervenors recount fee agreement with defend-
ants in claim for money found in defendants' possession), or is indirectly involved, as in a suit
for malicious prosecution where the defense of advice of counsel is raised, see, e.g., Stephens v.
Brown & Root, 338 F. Supp. 680 (W.D. La. 1971), afdper curiam, 455 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir.
1972).
27. See FED. R. Civ. P. 59.
28. See, e.g., Edgar v. Finley, 312 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1963) (motion for new trial should
have been granted where defendant exercised due diligence in trying to get accident wit-
nesses' names and addresses from plaintiff before trial but did not receive information until
after trial).
One leading case states that for a movant to prevail on a motion for new trial based on
newly discovered evidence, "there must ordinarily be present and concur five verities, to wit:
(a) The evidence must be in fact, newly discovered, ie., discovered since the trial; (b) facts
must be alleged from which the court may infer diligence on the part of the movant; (c) the
evidence relied on, must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (d) it must be material to
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the opposing party or counsel outside the courtroom. 0 When coun-
sel's affidavit meets the required standard of proof,31 its contribution
to the substance of the case might seriously harm the opposing
the issues involved; and (e) it must be such, and of such nature, as that, on a new trial, the
newly discovered evidence would probably produce an acquittal." Johnson v. United States,
32 F.2d 127, 130 (8th Cir. 1929). Courts are notably reluctant to accept affidavits from attor-
neys in this regard, since the newly discovered evidence ought to be available in affidavit form
directly from appropriate witnesses. See, e.g., In re Weltzien, 68 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D.N.Y.
1946); Collins v. Central Trust Co., 135 Misc. 465, 238 N.Y.S. 226 (Sup. Ct. 1929). But
where, as in Edgar v. Finley, the issue is the attorney's own diligence and opportunity to obtain
the evidence before trial, as in categories (a) and (b) above, his own affidavit may be not only
acceptable but crucial. But cf. Kleinschmidt v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 253 (D. Mass.
1956) (attorney's affidavit describing plaintiff's diligence insufficient where plaintiff's own
affidavit made no mention of efforts).
29. Normally the juror or other individual with first-hand knowledge of the misconduct
must be produced; courts hesitate to rely on an attorney's affidavit as to what a juror told
him. Thus in United States v. Gegax, 506 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1974), the court rejected a
motion for new trial supported by defense counsel's affidavit that a juror claimed to have
discussed a fact with her husband; affidavits from the juror or the husband were necessary. In
State v. James, 70 Wash. 2d 624, 424 P.2d 1005 (1967), according to defense counsel's affida-
vit, the jurors had conducted experiments in the jury room, thereby creating grounds for
setting aside the verdict; but the court insisted that the jurors themselves state first-hand what
occurred during deliberations. But see note 31 infra.
30. In Julien v. Barker, 75 Idaho 413, 272 P.2d 718 (1954), a wrongful death action
involving medical malpractice, plaintiff's attorneys moved for a new trial, supporting the
motion with an attorney affidavit asserting that the defense had intimidated expert medical
witnesses into withdrawing their offers of testimony for plaintiff at the last moment. The
court was sympathetic to the possibility of such intimidation, but declined to grant a new trial
when there was no showing by plaintiff's counsel as to why the doctors' affidavits could not be
had, or that the same intimidation would preclude obtaining such affidavits. Id. at 419-20,
272 P.2d at 721-22.
31. Although there is little discussion of the point, courts apparently will not grant a
motion for a new trial on the basis of affidavits which do not conform to the standards appli-
cable on summary judgment motions. Thus, except for Edgar v. Finlty, in each of the cases
cited in notes 28-30 supra, the courts refused to consider the lawyers' affidavits because they
were "hearsay." But as Professor Moore quite correctly points out, even the affidavits of
witnesses with first-hand knowledge are hearsay. 6A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, sufira
note 15, § 59.08[3], at 59-122 n.25. Professor Moore goes on to suggest that "the movant
should, if feasible, support his motion with the affidavits of the witnesses as to the proposed
new testimony. But if that is not feasible, then we believe that the movant should have the
right to submit affidavits of his attorneys. . . as to what the evidence or testimony will be."
Id. The argument does not seem to be that the court may then grant the motion on the basis
of counsel's affidavit, for Professor Moore goes on to say that "[t]he impossible or the imprac-
tical should not be required at the time the motion is made." Id. The suggestion seems rather
simply to be that an affidavit of counsel not made on first-hand knowledge is sufficient to
accompany the motion, as provided in FED. R. Civ. P. 59(c), given the 10-day time limit
imposed by Rule 59(b). Before the motion may be decided, however, counsel should present
competent proof of what the evidence would be. See Krodel v. Houghtaling, 468 F.2d 887
(4th Cir. 1972).
This conclusion is not undercut by the provision in FED. R. Civ. P. 59(d) that the court
may grant a new trial on its own initiative "for any reason for which it might have granted a
new trial on motion of a party," even for reasons not actually stated in a motion by either
party. It is entirely consistent with that provision to maintain that where the court's initiative
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party-either depriving it of the benefit of a verdict or nullifying the
chance of a second determination at a new trial.
Attorneys favor the practice of filing their own affidavits for a
number of reasons. Counsel often enjoys a relatively global view of
the case. Especially where he represents a large entity such as a gov-
ernment agency or business corporation, counsel is likely to be the
person best informed about the relevant legal theories and the avail-
able facts necessary to support them. Even if other witnesses or even
documentary proof can support particular facts, the attorney may
alone be able to place those facts in the scheme of his client's case. At
trial, a lawyer must adhere to the strictures of competent proof; his
global view does not allow him to simply take the stand and tell the
whole story as he sees it, no matter how many witnesses and docu-
ments the rules of evidence otherwise require.
But at both pretrial and posttrial proceedings, other constraints
may tempt attorneys to use their own affidavits, constraints which
perhaps ought to affect the permissibility of the practice as well.
Time is the most serious of these. In any given case, counsel will have
the maximum time for preparation between the filing of the com-
plaint and the trial itself. But the rules of evidence, designed for situ-
ations in which attorneys have had such relative luxury, may be
inappropriate during the press of pretrial and posttrial proceedings.
For instance, the Federal Rules allow a court to issue a temporary
restraining order even faster than the nonmoving party can receive
notice, or a preliminary injunction as quickly as notice can be
given.32 Where a party faces irreparable injury, the court may expe-
dite discovery on the basis of an ex parte determination.3 3 And al-
though the court may extend the time for responding to a motion for
summary judgment when the necessary affidavits cannot be se-
cured,3 in the ordinary case a party opposing a summary judgment
motion may have no more than 9 days to marshall his proof.35 Simi-
larly, the posttrial motion for a new trial based on extra-record evi-
dence must be served no more than 10 days after the entry of
is based on extra-record facts, proof of those facts must be as substantial as it would have to be
had a party moved on that basis.
32. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
33. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a): "Leave of court, granted with or without notice,
must be obtained. .. if the plaintiff seeks to take a deposition prior to the expiration of 30
days after service of the summons and complaint upon any defendant ...
34. FED. R. Cv. P. 56(f).





The affidavit practice is fostered, in the second place, by the rec-
ognition that at least up to the point at which summary judgment
motions are proper, the parties may have no more than information
and belief available to substantiate their respective views of the facts;
thus courts often expedite discovery, and may even grant interlocu-
tory injunctive relief on that scanty foundation. Given this inevita-
ble relaxation of the usual demand for competent evidence, the
attorney, who may have the best sources of information and grounds
for belief, becomes an appropriate affiant to advance the ersatz proof.
Notwithstanding the tugs which such forces exert in favor of per-
mitting counsel to participate in pre- (and post-) trial substantive de-
terminations, the practice raises serious ethical and legal problems.
The legal profession normally frowns upon lawyers appearing on the
stand in their clients' behalf, except as to merely formal or uncon-
tested matters, or in cases where the lawyer's services are of such pe-
culiar value that his withdrawal from the case would seriously harm
the client.3 7 Part II demonstrates, however, that the arguments nor-
mally posed against attorneys appearing as trial witnesses on the
merits may not apply to the more disembodied practice of attorney
affidavits.
Yet as Part III shows, even if the practice remains consistent with
the demands of professional responsibility, it may often exact a com-
pensating price-the loss of conventional work product protection.
Although an attorney's contentions and legal conclusions may be dis-
covered through interrogatories38 and requests for admissions39 sent
to his client, a lawyer is ordinarily entitled to resist inquiry into the
way he gathered information, the way he intends to present his case
at trial, and-to a more limited extent-the documents not embody-
ing his mental impressions which he has prepared or procured in
preparation for litigation.' But when counsel has secured some kind
of affirmative relief--expedited discovery, an interlocutory injunc-
tion, partial summary judgment or the denial of summary judgment,
the grant or denial of a new trial--on the basis of his own sworn
statement, the attorney's own credibility and the accuracy of his in-
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) eases the time pressure by permitting a motion for new trial
within 1 year of judgment if the ground for the motion is "mistake, inadvertence, surprise
. . . excusable neglect," newly discovered evidence that could not have been uncovered ear-
lier even with due diligence, or fraudulent conduct by the verdict-winner.
37. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-101 & 5-102.
38. FED. R. Crv. P. 33(b).
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a).
40. See notes 117-34 infra and accompanying text.
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formation necessarily become issues, and the opposing party may be
entitled to examine his files and take his deposition to discover what
would otherwise be protected information.
Finally, Part IV offers some preliminary guidelines for determin-
ing whether the filing of a particular affidavit should entail waiver of
work product protection, and what the scope of that waiver should
be.
II. THE QUESTION OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
Although the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility does not
directly address the question of attorney affidavits, one element of
the Code suggests at least in a preliminary way that the normal con-
straints on counsel testifying for their clients may not strictly apply to
the affidavit practice: The Code explicitly approves a lawyer's verifi-
cation of his client's pleading.4 In verifying statements in a plead-
ing, counsel puts his honesty at stake, particularly since the client has
neither prepared those statements nor, in many instances, understood
them.42 Moreover, by his averment concerning the facts at issue the
lawyer plays a role in putting the opposing party to a substantial
burden on time and resources. Thus ABA Code recognition of attor-
ney verification may be taken to suggest approval of the affidavit
practice in general.
But verification at the pleading stage is far removed from other
types of pretrial affidavits. It is not only tolerable but necessary that
counsel should be identified with a statement which is necessary to
initiate the litigation, but which the client is unable to compose.4 3 It
41. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-25 states that "a lawyer
should subscribe to or verify only those pleadings that he believes are in compliance with
applicable law and rules."
Verification is still required by many states employing some derivative of the old Code
pleading. See note 5 supra. And even though the Federal Rules and their state offspring have
dispensed with the requirement of verification, such rules still require the attorney to sign the
pleading, and assert that his signature "constitutes a certificate by him that. . . to the best of
his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support" the pleading. E.g.,
FED. R. Civ. P. 11. The Federal Rules dispensed with the requirement of verification largely
because it favored the unscrupulous litigant. See R. MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE
TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 173 (1952); 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra
note 9, § 1333.
42. See Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966). But cf. Risinger, Honesty in
Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problenm with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61
MINN. L. REv. 1, 6 n.16 (1976) (verification may be counterproductive and lead to clients
and lawyers passing the buck to each other).




is also true that the strictures imposed before verification or certifica-
tion may be subscribed are, especially under the Federal Rules, more
relaxed than they are at any later point in the litigation: While hon-
esty is demanded, it is far from clear that any duty to investigate is
imposed,44 and the grounds for information and belief will not be
scrutinized too carefully. A correlative consideration is that the ne-
cessity for any detailed factual statement is, under most modem
schemes, postponed until the discovery stage, with the result that
declarations made at the pleading stage have far less binding effect
than those made as trial becomes more imminent.
Most attorney affidavits seem therefore to fall inevitably into an
uncertain area between the relaxed standards of verification and the
strict standards of trial evidence. Analysis of the professional ethics
of the affidavit practice thus requires us to consider how the general
provisions of the ABA Code concerning attorney testimony bear on
the affidavit question. Such analysis ultimately reveals that the affi-
davit practice deserves greater freedom from the strictures against
combining the role of advocate and witness than does actual trial
testimony.
A. The Arguments Against Attorney Testimony
The general position of the ABA Code of Professional Responsi-
bility on attorneys acting as witnesses in their clients' behalf is that:
If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending
litigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his
firm ought to be called as a witness on behalf of his client, he shall
withdraw from the conduct of the trial and his firm, if any, shall
not continue representation in the trial, except that he may con-
tinue the representation and he or a lawyer in his firm may testify
in the circumstances enumerated in DR 5-101(B)(1) through (4).45
Those circumstances, set out in the rule dealing with acceptance of
employment in the first instance, are:
(1) If the testimony will relate solely to an uncontested matter.
(2) If the testimony will relate solely to a matter of formality and
there is no reason to believe that substantial evidence will be of-
fered in opposition to the testimony.
(3) If the testimony will relate solely to the nature and value of
legal services rendered in the case by the lawyer or his firm to the
client.
(4) As to any matter, if refusal would work a substantial hardship
44. See 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, sufira note 9, at § 1333; McCaskill, The Modem
Philosophy of Pleading: A Dialogue Outside the Shades, 38 A.B.A.J. 123 (1952).
45. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-102.
[Vol. 31:191
A TTORNEY AFFIDAVITS
on the client because of the distinctive value of the lawyer or his
firm as counsel in the particular case.46
The new Disciplinary Rules are essentially a clarification of old
Canon 19 of the Canons of Professional Ethics,4 7 although in one
respect the new Code may enunciate a somewhat stricter and more
specific test. While the Canons permitted a lawyer to act as witness
for his client when it was "essential to the ends of justice," the Code
suggests that "doubts should be resolved in favor of the lawyer testi-
fying and against his continuing or becoming an advocate." '48
Another provision of the Code prohibits the trial lawyer from at-
tempting to assert his personal knowledge or opinion in argument
rather than as a witness:
In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer
shall not...
(3) Assert his personal knowledge of the facts in issue, except
when testifying as a witness.
(4) Assert his personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to
the credibility of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant, or
as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, but he may argue, on his
analysis of the evidence, for any position or conclusion with respect
to the matters stated herein.
49
Although there is little agreement among the commentators
about the general purpose of forbidding attorneys to act in a testimo-
nial capacity,' Ethical Consideration 5-9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility does outline the chief arguments in support of the
rule:
Occasionally a lawyer is called upon to decide in a particular case
whether he will be a witness or an advocate. If a lawyer is both
counsel and witness, he becomes more easily impeachable for inter-
46. Id., DR 5-101(B).
47. "When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such
as the attestation of custody of an instrument or the like, he should leave the trial of the case
to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends ofjustice, a lawyer should avoid testifying
in court in behalf of his client." ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 19.
48. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-10; see Frankel, Book Review,
43 U. CHI. L. REV. 874, 878 (1976) (ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY). Provi-
sions rather similar to those in Canon 5 of the new Code are found in the Codes of Trial
Conduct promulgated by the American College of Trial Lawyers in 1967 and 1972. See 43
A.B.A.J. 223 (1957) (Article VI); 58 A.B.A.J. 709 (1972) (Article XII).
49. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-106.
50. Perhaps the only principle that would meet general consent is that disqualification
does not find its source in any notion of the attorney's incompetence as a witness. See French
v. Hall, 119 U.S. 152 (1886); FED. R. EVID. 601; 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE 601[04], at 601-31 to 601-35; 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 6911, at 773-88;




est and thus may be a less effective witness. Conversely, the oppos-
ing counsel may be handicapped in challenging the credibility of
the lawyer when the lawyer also appears as an advocate in the case.
An advocate who becomes a witness is in the unseemly and ineffec-
tive position of arguing his own credibility. The roles of an advo-
cate and of a witness are inconsistent; the function of an advocate is
to advance or argue the cause of another, while that of a witness is
to state facts objectively.5 '
The first argument is that counsel will hurt his client's case by
offering testimony impeachable for interest. Critics have noted that
this argument unnecessarily sets attorneys apart from other poten-
tially interested witnesses whose credibility is simply tested on cross-
examination.5 2 Moreover, the lawyer will not likely dispel the image
of interest by resigning, since he may just as well have become irrevo-
cably biased while representing the client at the earlier stages of liti-
gation or in other legal matters.
53
The second argument, ironic when paired with the first, is that
testimony by an attorney puts his client's opponent at a disadvan-
tage, since the latter will have a hard time attacking the credibility of
a lawyer. But any greater weight that the jury might give to this
testimony may be due to perfectly legitimate evidentiary considera-
tions: the witness's demeanor in court and standing in his commu-
nity. In any event, the lawyer's interest in the case is more likely to
diminish, rather than enhance, his credibility.5 4 If the Code argu-
ment means that opposing counsel's sense of professional fraternity
will overcome his partisan duty to his client and cause him to go easy
in cross-examination of a fellow attorney, then the rule aims at the
wrong lawyer.1
5
The third justification advanced by the Code is that it would be
"unseemly and ineffective" for counsel to argue his own credibility.5
If ineffectiveness stems from counsel's interest in the case, this argu-
51. ABA CODE OF PROFEssIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-9.
52. See Enker, The Rationale of the Rule That Forbids a Lawyer To Be Advocate and Witness in
the Same Case, 1977 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 455, 457; Comment, The Rule Prohibit-
ing an Attomqrnom Testifiing at a Clients Tal An Ethical Paradox, 45 U. CIN. L. REv. 268, 270
(1976).
Wigmore asserts that the imipeachability argument for disqualification has "totally dis-
appeared from the controversy." 6J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1911, at 775.
53. See Enker, supra note 52, at 457; Comment, supra note 52, at 270.
54. See Sutton, supra note 50, at 480.
55. See Enker, supra note 52, at 457-58.
56. The same justification would seem to underlie the provision in the American Col-
lege of Trial Lawyers' Code of Trial Conduct that "if circumstances do not permit with-
drawal from the conduct of the trial, the lawyer should not argue the credibility of his own
testimony." American College of Trial Lawyers, A Code of Trial Conduct, 43 A.B.A.J. 223,
224-25 (1957).
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ment adds little to the first. On the other hand, if the rule is merely
intended to keep lawyers from embarrassing themselves on the stand,
it seems superfluous-those who would do so either lack modesty or
common sense to begin with or have countervailing reasons for run-
ning risk of embarrassment.
5 7
The final assertion of Ethical Consideration 5-9---that the roles of
advocate and witness are fundamentally incompatible-reflects what
Wigmore characterizes as:
the fear that the testimony of the counsel and his statements in
argument might be so identified in the minds of the jury that they
would give to the argument a testimonial credit and effect, as if the
oath of the counsel as witness were pledged to it, and thus be un-
duly impressed with its weight.58
This basis for the rule does not fit very well with the argument that
the testimony of counsel is vulnerable to impeachment. 59 Nor is it
entirely consistent with the suggestion, discussed below, that the pub-
lic image of the profession will suffer if counsel is permitted to tes-
tify.6o On the other hand, the point of this argument may really be
that, by acting as both advocate and witness, the lawyer himself will
become confused, injecting fact or opinion not introduced in evi-
dence into his argument. But it is difficult to see how the attorney's
decision to testify increases this danger, which exists whenever coun-
sel is familiar with facts outside the record.6'
A final argument for barring counsel from testifying holds "not
that lawyers as witnesses may distort the truth in favor of the client,
but that the public will think they may, and that the public's respect
for the profession and confidence in it will be effectively dimin-
ished."' 62 This argument seems to meet with more general agreement
57. See Enker, supra note 52, at 458-59 (criticizing argument that embarrassment is a
factor in attorney testimony as a makeweight obscuring real improprieties involved). But see
Sutton, supra note 50, at 481-82 (legal profession is well advised to protect its public image
from harsh criticism directed at attorney testimony).
58. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1911, at 780 (citing Stones v. Byron, 4 Dowl. & L.
393, 75 Rev. R. 881 (Q.B. 1846)). A variation on this same argument holds that while the
jurors may not give undue testimonial weight to the arguments of counsel, they will evaluate
his argument-favorably or unfavorably-by their impression of his integrity and credibility
rather than by the force of its reason. Enker, supra note 52, at 457.
59. See Enker, supra note 52, at 462-65.
60. Set 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1911, at 780. Quite apart from any such conflict,
it has been argued that, stated in these terms, the rule is more appropriately one of trial
practice than of professional ethics. Enker, supra note 52, at 461.
61. See Sutton, supra note 50, at 480-81.
62. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1911, at 775-76. Wigmore terms this formulation
"the most potent and most common reason judicially advanced." Id. at 776.
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than the others,63 but commentators have argued that the profes-
sional image is in many instances unlikely to suffer, 4 especially
where there is no independent reason for regarding attorney testi-
mony as intrinsically wrongful. 5
The absence of a clear scholarly consensus on the arguments op-
posing attorney testimony should not be taken to suggest the wisdom
of the practice. Given the choice, an attorney would make a tactical
blunder to offer his own testimony instead of that of an available
disinterested witness. That strategic argument alone ensures that the
approach does not become commonplace. 6 No doubt some attor-
neys may testify either because they succumb to the temptation to
falsify or because they simply neglect the standards of competent
trial practice. But even if reprehensible in an officer of the court,
such obviously dishonest conduct violates explicit provisions of the
Code other than the ban on attorney testimony. 7 The uncertainty
of the arguments for barring counsel from the stand does, however,
caution against extending the ban indiscriminately to situations
where an advocate furthers his client's cause by the more preliminary
act of filing an affidavit.
B. The Arguments Applied to the Afftidavit Practice
One of the arguments against attorney testimony is simply irrele-
vant to affidavits filed by counsel. The danger that a jury will give
testimonial weight to the attorney's argument, or will at least be dis-
tracted from assessing its logical force, obviously cannot arise, since
it will virtually always be the judge who passes on counsel's affidavit.
On the other hand, a second argument-that the attorney will
himself become confused about the roles of advocate and wit-
ness-probably applies with as much force to affidavits as to oral
68testimony. Yet as the previous section showed, this is perhaps the
63. See, e.g., Sutton, supra note 50, at 482; Note, The Ethical Propiety of an Attomer Testi-
fing in Behalf of Hir Own Client, 38 IowA L. REV. 139, 146 (1952); Comment, The Attomy as
Both Advocate and Witness, 4 CREIGHTON L. REv. 128, 145 (1970).
64. See Comment, supra note 52, at 271.
65. See Enker, supra note 52, at 459.
66. Indeed, one commentator observes that the rule against attorney testimony is more
properly one of trial practice than of professional ethics. See id at 461.
67. See, e.g., ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-102(A)(2)-(6).
68. That contention seems in fact to have been decisive in Inglett & Co. v. Everglades
Fertilizer Co., 255 F.2d 342, 349 (5th Cir. 1958), where the court stated: "But without im-
pugning any improper professional motive to this obviously able counsel, we doubt that the
disposition of patent cases is furthered by counsel being the personal vehicle by which the
'undisputed' facts are put before the Court. We consider it a tribute to the high calling of
advocacy to say that we think it an unnatural, if not virtually impossible, task for counsel, in
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most ill-examined contention against attorney testimony in the first
place. We are left, then, with a number of arguments against attor-
ney testimony which may apply, although with a different impact, to
the affidavit practice.
1. Counsel's ineffectiveness as a witness.
The first argument noted above was that a lawyer's testimony on
behalf of his client is typically impeachable for interest. No doubt
the use of the affidavit form rather than oral testimony does not by
itself mitigate the problem of potential or apparent bias. But the
danger of impeachability in the case of affidavits may be outweighed
by practical problems that do not arise in the case of oral testimony
at trial.
The problem of a court misapplying the normal strictures on
attorney testimony is illustrated by Inglett & Co. v. Everglades Ferti-
lizer Co. ,69 an action for patent infringement. The defendant
-Everglades--sought summary judgment on the ground of antici-
pation by prior art; its motion relied entirely on the affidavit of
Samuel Stoll, counsel for defendant, describing the operation of a
machine which another company-Arcady Mills-allegedly had in
use prior to the grant of the plaintiff's patent. Reversing the district
court's grant of summary judgment, the court of appeals expressed its
concern that the "inherently unsound practice" of attorney affidavits
violated the standards of professional responsibility. 70 Though the
court did not clearly refer to a specific argument in support of the
stricture against attorney testimony,71 it expressed serious doubt
about the factual validity of an affidavit in which the "interstitial
argument" of an interested person sought to perform the job of com-
petent testimony.72
The Inglett court was correct if it simply meant that Stoll was
unlikely to secure a summary judgment with his own affidavit which
was impeachable for interest. Stoll's client bore the burden of proof
his own case, to drop his garments of advocacy and take on the somber garb of an objective
fact-stater. Certainly we would not reverse a judge for entering summary judgment merely
because some of the papers included argumentative conclusions. But if the 'facts' are really
facts, they should be put forward as such without interstitial argumentation."
69. 255 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1958).
70. Id. at 349-50.
71. "The reason behind the accepted canon on counsel testifying is or may be present,
at least tentatively since the Court is put in the position of passing upon the credibility of the
contending votaries. Experience proves that the adversary system functions best when the
role of Judge, of counsel, of witness if [sic] sharply separated." Id. at 350.
72. Id. at 349-50.
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on the issue of anticipation by prior art, and it would have been un-
wise, if not improper, for Stoll to use his own affidavit rather than
that of some available impartial witness. But the court underesti-
mated the practical exigencies of counsel's position. Stoll may have
been unable to secure a similar affidavit from one of the operators of
Arcady Mills, for as the court noted:
These participants. . . all. . . seemed genuinely anxious to find
out and record all of the pertinent information. . . without unduly
imposing on this stranger to the controversy [Arcady Mills].73
And any expert hired by the defendant would likely have been sub-
ject to the same disability as Stoll. Given that dilemma, it is difficult
to say that Stoll's affidavit was unethical simply because its credibil-
ity may have been attacked for interest.
Inglett may seem a peculiar case, but the tight time deadlines gen-
erally associated with pretrial motions argue against applying the
canons against testimony straightaway to affidavits, despite the com-
mon problem of impeachability for interest.
For example, in Douglas v. Benefial Finance Co. ,74 a Truth in
Lending Act class action, defendants moved for summary judgment
on April 12, 1971 and on April 19 plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for
summary judgment. 75 Attached to the motion were affidavits of
three attorneys, including plaintiff's counsel, who had attended the
state court deposition of the manager of one of the defendants. At his
deposition-which was apparently untranscribed-the manager had
testified about the number of notes transferred for collection to and
from his office monthly; the affidavits of counsel were needed to es-
tablish the manager's admission.76 Though plaintiffs could theoreti-
cally have appointed substitute counsel, Federal Rule 56(c) may
have given them as little as 10 days to do so.77 It is true that at an
early stage in the litigation the matter of transfer is more easily ef-
fected once substitute counsel can be located, since he will need less
time to familiarize himself with the case. But there may simply not
be time to find a substitute, particularly in cases where the demand
73. Id. at 345 n.5.
74. 334 F. Supp. 1166 (D. Alas. 1971), reo'd in part on other grounds, 469 F.2d 453 (9th Cir.
1972).
75. Id. at 1169.
76. Id.
77. Under FED. R. CIv. P. 56(o, the court may continue the motion for summary judg-
ment when Affidavits are "unavailable" in order that the party opposing the motion may
collect his evidence. That may not have helped the plaintiff in Douglas, however, if no one
was present at the deposition besides counsel and the witness. It may be, though, that the
information was available in documentary form. Ste Graham v. Pennsylvania R.R., 13 Fed.
R. Serv. 943 (S.D. Ohio 1949).
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for preliminary injunctive relief or a temporary restraining order
makes hearing and decision of the motion a matter of urgency.
The ABA Disciplinary Rules provide that counsel may act as
both advocate and witness at trial "if refusal would work a substan-
tial hardship on the client because of the distinctive value of the law-
yer or his firm as counsel in the particular case."' 78 Although the
exception seems mainly intended to justify attorney testimony in
cases "where the lawyer has long and intimate familiarity with the
details of the matter in litigation, ' 79 and with the affairs of the client,
it may properly apply where the necessity for counsel's testimony
arises during trial or so close to the time of trial that the matter of
finding a substitute would cause hardship." Such a reading of the
Code suggests that attorneys' affidavits might be proper almost as a
matter of course, if not on summary judgment, at least in connection
with applications for interlocutory injunctive relief where a delay
could result in irreparable harm. And Formal Opinion 339 recog-
nizes that testimony-and presumably a fortiori affidavits-may be
proper in connection with posttrial motions because of the attorney's
almost irreplaceable familiarity with the case at that point.8'
A second exception to the bar on attorney testimony-that for
testimony on uncontested fact s 2-may also overcome the impeacha-
bility of affidavits in particular cases. In Lula v. Sivaco Wire & Nail
Co. 83 plaintiff mother sued for mental anguish caused by the death
of her son in an automobile collision, and plaintiff father sued for loss
of consortium and medical expenses occasioned by his wife's emo-
tional disturbance. The defendants moved for summary judgment on
78. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-101(B)(4).
79. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 220 (1941).
80. See Erwin M. Jennings Co. v. DiGenova, 107 Conn. 491,499, 141 A. 866,869 (1928)
(improper to continue as counsel where lawyer "has knowledge that he would be required to
be a witness in ample time to have secured other counsel"); Schwartz v. Wenger, 267 Minn.
40, 43, 124 N.W.2d 489, 491 (1963) (counsel should not testify "unless circumstances arise
which could not be anticipated'); ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No.
339 (1975) (where unanticipated developments made counsel's testimony essential, "it would
be manifestly unfair to the client to be compelled to seek new trial counsel at substantial
additional expense and perhaps to have to seek a delay of the trial'); American College of
Trial Lawyers, A Code of Trial Conduct, 43 A.B.A.J. 223, 224 (1957) (when counsel's testimony
first becomes necessary during trial, a substitute should be found only "if feasible and not
prejudicial to his client's case').
81. "By the same criterion, a lawyer having knowledge of misconduct of a juror during
the trial of a case is not required to withdraw as counsel in the proceedings in order to testify
as to facts of which he has knowledge." ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, supra note
80.
82. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-101(B)(1).
83. 265 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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both of those counts, supported by affidavits of their attorneys which
stated that plaintiff mother was not involved in the accident and was
nowhere in the vicinity when it happened. The court granted sum-
mary judgment, since none of the possible choices of law applicable
to the case provided recovery for such emotional disturbance when
plaintiff was not involved in or endangered by the accident and did
not witness the accident. Without even considering the potential eth-
ical impropriety of counsels' affidavits, the court accepted them be-
cause it found it apparent from the pleadings and the affidavits that
the facts were not disputed.84
2. The difflilty of attacking counsels credibility.
The second argument for forbidding counsel to testify at trial is
the difficulty the opposing attorney will have in attacking the attor-
ney's credibility as a witness. This argument may be based on the
idea that a jury might give undue weight to the testimony of a law-
yer, but it is doubtful that the judge, who decides all motions based
on affidavits, would be equally impressionable. The law constantly
relies on judges to disregard inflammatory, irrelevant, or incompe-
tent evidence. 5 Their ability to do so should also enable them to
avoid inflating the credibility of a lawyer's evidence. 6
If the point of this argument is rather that opposing counsel will
allow his sense of professional fraternity to overcome his duty to his
client to challenge adverse evidence, attacking the credibility of his
opponent's affidavit presents none of the discomfort of a face-to-face
cross-examination. An attorney cross-examining opposing counsel
might have to apply such conventional tactics as instilling fear in the
witness," or probing trivial matters when it could be to his advan-
tage,88 or leading the witness so as to impress his unpleasant de-
meanor on the factfinder. 9 But when counsel's testimony appears in
an affidavit, the opposing attorney in any event has few opportuni-
84. Id. at 224. Since the affidavits were not made on personal knowledge, they would
not ordinarily satisfy the requirements of a motion for summary judgment under FED. R.
CIV. P. 56(e).
85. See, e.g., Builders Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 179 F.2d 377, 379 (8th Cir. 1950) ("In
the trial of a nonjury case, it is virtually impossible for a trial judge to commit reversible error
by receiving incompetent evidence, whether objected to or not.").
86. Of course, to the extent that Disciplinary Rule 5-102, see note 2 supra, is grounded
on the fear of jury misperception, the argument presented here regarding affidavits would
apply with equal force to any form of testimony by counsel, including taking the stand at trial
in a nonjury case.
87. See R. REDFIELD, CROSS EXAMINATION AND THE WITNESS 227 (1963).
88. Id. at 94.
89. See N. STEVENSON, SUCCESSFUL CROSS EXAMINATION STRATEGY 204 (1971).
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ties to impeach, obtain admissions, and develop new facts, and so is
unlikely even to get the chance to employ abrasive trial techniques.
Finally, the low evidentiary foundation required for most affida-
vits may make an attack on opposing counsel's sworn testimony
much less distasteful than normal cross-examination. Although af-
fidavits filed in connection with motions for summary judgment must
ordinarily "set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence,
and. . . show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to
the matters stated therein,"' the same restrictions do not necessarily
apply to affidavits filed at earlier and less dispositive junctures in the
litigation. No such requirements apply to an attorney's verification
or certification of a complaint, which only signifies that "to the best
of his knowledge, information and belief there is good ground to sup-
port it,"'" and even a motion for a preliminary injunction or a tem-
porary restraining order may be sought on the basis of affidavits filed
on information and belief.92 An attorney may therefore undermine
the affidavit of opposing counsel without impugning his personal in-
tegrity or credibility, merely by showing that the witness drew his
conclusions on the basis of inadequate information or unfounded,
though honest, belief.
3. The unseemliness of counsel arguing his own credibility.
Another reason advanced for the rule against counsel acting as
witness is that it places him in the "unseemly and ineffective posi-
tion" of arguing his own credibility. As noted above,93 if this justifi-
cation merely reflects the desire to save counsel from embarrassment,
it does not deserve the status of an ethical prescription. Perhaps the
underlying premise is that the client will suffer if his attorney avoids
reference to his own credibility, rather than subject himself to the
immodesty of arguing that potentially significant point in his sum-
mation. If so, important ethical differences again arise between the
filing of an affidavit by counsel and an attorney's testimony as wit-
ness. In the first place, any attack by opposing counsel on the credi-
bility of an affidavit is likely to be rather detached, making any
response similarly aseptic. To return to Inglett & Co. v. Everglades Fer-
tilizer Co.94 for a moment, plaintiff's counsel would probably have
90. FED. R. CIv. P. 56(e).
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
92. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
93. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
94. 255 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1958); see text accompanying notes 69-73 supra.
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attempted to attack Stoll's affidavit by showing: (1) that Stoll had
little experience with machines of the type in question; (2) that
Stoll's description of the competing plant's machine was based on
observation which lasted perhaps only an hour; (3) that the affidavit
contained several mistakes of technical terminology; and (4) that
Stoll was being paid on a contingent fee basis, and so had reason to
describe the machines' operations as being very similar.95 Though
the last argument might have caused some discomfort, notably ab-
sent would have been any comment on Stoll's appearance, his con-
duct while testifying, his lack of candor, or any suggestion that he
may have recanted a statement on the stand, all of which would have
been fair comment had he testified in person.96 Stoll himself, in any
oral argument before the judge, could confine his argument concern-
ing the credibility of his affidavit to the facts on paper, without men-
tion of his state of mind.
Similarly, since affidavits outside the context of summary judg-
ment may be made on information and belief,97 the focus of ques-
tions regarding the credibility of such affidavits is removed still
further from the character of the witness, to the more objective ques-
tion of which facts constitute the basis for his information and belief.
4. The image of the profession.
Many argue that the image of the legal profession suffers from the
public belief that lawyers can and will distort the truth in favor of
their clients. 8 There is no empirical evidence on exactly how the
public gains this impression, but presumably, since a trial is a public
event, frequently attended by newspeople as well as spectators, word
will get out that a certain lawyer testified on behalf of his client, who
subsequently won the case. If counsel's testimony were to become a
fixture at most trials, people would doubtless begin to suspect that
lawyers were not hired solely for their legal skills. But-legal and prac-
tical limits assure that attorney testimony will always be infrequent.
Not only does the hearsay rule guarantee that in the ordinary case
counsel will have no competent knowledge of the events in question,
but attorneys tend to select disinterested witnesses, if available,
purely as a matter of self interest in the typical lawsuit. Furthermore,
permitting counsel to testify while continuing his representation does
95. See 255 F.2d at 346-48 & n.10.
96. See, e.g., 5 F. BUSCH, LAW AND TACTICS IN JURY TRIALS § 640 (1963); J. STEIN,
CLOSING ARGUMENT § 16 (1969).
97. See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., 6J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1911, at 775-80.
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not eliminate all ethical sanctions against those inclined to abuse the
right to testify.99 Thus it is more realistic to discuss the effect on the
image of the profession in terms not only of the appearance of truth-
distortion to a hypothetical audience, but also of the likely existence
or size of that audience.
This perspective clearly distinguishes filing an affidavit from tak-
ing the stand. The former activity does not occur in open court, and
is much more likely to go unnoticed by those not party to the litiga-
tion. Moreover, since the affidavit is usually served on opposing
counsel,"° it may not even come to the attention of the opposing
paro, unless he takes more than the usual interest in the details of the
litigation."' 1 To be sure, any interested member of the public may
secure a copy of the affidavit from the clerk's office where it is on file,
and in cases of some significance the fact that counsel submitted an
affidavit may appear in the newspapers or in a published opinion of
the court. It seems highly unlikely, however, that the public would
in general even be aware of the practice.
An attorney is likely to have a more compelling need to file his
own affidavit in a nontrial proceeding than to present live testimony
at trial. Moreover, in filing an affidavit, the attorney is "participat-
ing" in the litigation in a less substantial sense than he would as a
trial witness. For these reasons, the attorney affidavit practice should
remain relatively free of the general barriers the rules of professional
responsibility place before attorneys acting as witnesses in their cli-
ents' cases.
C. A Scheme for Assessing the Ethical Problem
The preceding section measured the ethics of the affidavit prac-
tice against the arguments traditionally advanced against counsel
acting as a witness in a case in which he was engaged, and suggested
that those arguments applied with less force to situations where an
99. See, e.g., ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILITY, DR 7-102(A)(2)-(6).
100. See FED. R. CIv. P. 5(b).
101. As a practical matter, counsel would not ordinarily send a client copies of every
paper filed in an action, nor review them one by one when the client came to the office.
Apart from the expense involved, counsel may well conclude that the client's interest is better
served by confining discussion to what facts the other side has shown, and how they should be
controverted, rather than risk confusing, frustrating, or discouraging an unsophisticated client
with the complex and sometimes offensive statements in opposing papers. Even where the
papers themselves would be comparatively harmless, detailed review with the client may sim-
ply be unproductive use of both his and counsel's time. In either case, then, the existence of
an attorney's affidavit would probably be known only by "insiders" to the trial process: coun-
sel for both sides, and the court.
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attorney merely files an affidavit. That discussion demonstrated that
some variables may affect the question of propriety to a greater de-
gree than others. For example, where time is short-as it may be on
a motion for a temporary restraining order-the courts might look
more kindly on counsel's participation than where there is more lei-
sure to secure either substitute counsel or alternate sources of proof.
It remains to classify those variables which might assist the court and
the practitioner to determine the permissibility of the affidavit
practice.
1. The extent ofparticz'ation by counsel.
One element which plainly will cover a wide spectrum is the de-
gree to which the attorney's affidavit draws him into the litigation.
The more directly counsel speaks to disputed issues close to the merits
of the case, the more significant will be the questions of his credibility
and effectiveness as a witness and the impression carried off by the
public of the role and character of the profession. While an attorney
may enter the litigation in innumerable ways, two in particular war-
rant attention because of the frequency with which they occur.
The first has to do with authenticating the elements of proof in-
troduced on pretrial motions. By the time of trial the authenticity
and custody of most documents which are material to the litigation
have been established, without the need for proof, by means of a
number of procedural devices. Most simply, it can be done by stipu-
lation of the parties of their own accord. But the Federal Rules also
provide that a party may request an admission of the truth of any
matter, "including the genuineness of any documents described in
the request,"' °2 if stipulation should prove unavailing. Moreover,
Rule 16 allows the court to call a pretrial conference for, among
other reasons, the purpose of "obtaining admissions of fact and of
documents which will avoid unnecessary proof."' 103 But when relief
is sought at the pretrial stage, and particularly in cases involving a
request for preliminary injunctive relief or a temporary restraining
order, the parties may have little time to avail themselves of these
advantages; and most often no pretrial conference will have taken
place.' °4 Consequently, it frequently happens, especially in cases
which rest largely on documentary proof, that disposition of pretrial
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a).
103. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(3).
104. See, e.g., Local Court Rule 1-15, District of Columbia; Pollack, Pretrial Conferences,
50 F.R.D. 451; Murrah, Ae-Trial Procedure, 14 F.R.D. 417, 421; Clark, Objectives of Pre-Thal
Procedure, 17 OHIo ST. L.J. 163, 165 (1956).
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motions requires the active participation of counsel, at least to the
extent of authenticating the elements of proof.10 5 The Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility provides a special exemption for testimony
by counsel concerning merely formal matters, including the attesta-
tion or custody of an instrument. 0 6 In light of the arguments ad-
vanced to support the ban on testimony this is not at all surprising;
what is significant is that for the reasons just mentioned, the inci-
dence of lawyer-authentication is likely to be far higher in connection
with pretrial affidavits than it is at the trial itself. This exception
thus provides sufficient justification for a rather large number of in-
stances in which affidavits of counsel will be filed.
A second issue warrants special mention because of the frequency
with which ex parte motions will be made prior to trial. 0 7 The fact
that counsel's affidavit sets forth only uncontested facts obviously
provides the strongest indication of its permissibility,'0 8 and the Code
in such cases permits the even more drastic step of counsel taking the
stand as a witness.' Does the fact that ex parte motions are by defi-
nition uncontested suffice automatically to bring counsel's affidavit
within the Code's exemption?
Undoubtedly the provision in the Code concerning uncontested
facts was thought to be justified because with regard to such matters
the credibility of counsel's statement is not a part of the factfinder's
concern. That being so, nearly all of the arguments against a lawyer
taking the stand evaporate." 0 Even at trial, however, it may happen
that counsel's statement, though not contradicted by any direct evi-
dence, is not only material, but sufficiently questionable to create a
jury issue, and in such a situation the Code seems to advise against
the attorney continuing his representation."' Similar considerations
105. See, e.g., SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968); SEC v. Frank,
388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968); SEC v. General Refractorieg Co., 400 F. Supp. 1248 (D.D.C.
1975).
106. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-101; id., EC 5-10 & n.11; see
Opinions of the Ethics Committee of the State Bar of Wisconsin, Wis. B. BULL., December
1974 Supplement, at 54 (Mem. Op. May 16, 1968); N.Y. County Opinion 28 (May 1913).
107. See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
108. See, e.g., Lula v. Sivaco Wire & Nail Co., 265 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
109. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY, DR 5-101(B)(1).
110. See Sutton, supra note 50, at 491.
111. See id. at 492. Since publication of Professor Sutton's article, Canon 19, which
spoke only of testimony about "merely formal matters," see note 47 supra, has been replaced
by Disciplinary Rule 5-101(B)(1) & (2), the first part of which speaks of testimony relating
"solely to an uncontested matter," and the second part of which speaks of testimony which
"will relate solely to a matter of formality." Unhappily the amendment does little to clarify
the ambiguity of the word "uncontested." Ethical Consideration 5-10 states that testimony is
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should govern the approach to affidavits filed in connection with ex
parte motions, since the mere fact that there is no opposition by no
means indicates that what counsel has to say is unimpeachable. This
is not to suggest that such an affidavit is improper altogether, for as
the preceding section indicates, the arguments against testimony by
counsel are much less persuasive when applied to affidavits. It is only
to point out that the affidavit wins no extra points for setting forth
uncontested matter.
2. Type of relief sought
One significant difference between testimony by counsel at trial
and affidavits filed by counsel in advance of trial is that the latter
may at times seek relief which is unrelated to the merits of the litiga-
tion. Although it seems a priori evident that that circumstance
should make the practice more justifiable, it is perhaps worthwhile to
dwell for a moment on the reasons why it should be so. Take by way
of example the following case: Company A, seeking to avoid a take-
over by Company B, asks for expedited discovery so that the merits
may be resolved before a tender offer is made. Counsel's affidavit
will of course address the merits of the case-the likelihood that a
tender offer will be made, the injury which will accrue to A's share-
holders if the acquisition goes through, B's prior history, and so
on-but the relief sought is merely procedural, and ought not in any
predictable fashion to affect the outcome of the litigation. By far the
most significant fact about such a motion is that it is likely to receive
only the most cursory attention from the court. It will in virtually all
cases be decided without any oral testimony whatsoever,' 12 and may
well be decided without oral argument." 3 Moreover, what argu-
ment there is will often be assigned for hearing to a magistrate."
4
In such a situation there is little force behind the concern that
opposing counsel will find it difficult to attack the credibility of a
fellow member of the bar. Not only is the statement which itself is at
issue reified in the form of an affidavit-thus severely limiting the
possibilities of impeachment, obtaining admissions, and developing
new facts-but any attack on the statement under oath may itself be
made behind the cover of a document. Worries about the unseemli-
proper concerning "an uncontested issue," and illustrates the point by a footnote which
merely quotes old Canon 19. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY, EC 5-10.
112. See, e.g., Local Court Rule 220.8, Northern District of California.
113. See, e.g., Local Court Rule 220.1, Northern District of California; Local Rule 12,
Southern District of Illinois; Local Court Rule 1-9(o, District of the District of Columbia.
114. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1978); Local Magistrate Rule
1.01(C)(3), Northern District of Illinois.
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ness of counsel arguing his own credibility dissolve for the same rea-
sons. Finally, the image of the profession is unlikely to suffer any
irreparable damage, for at least two reasons in addition to those ad-
vanced in the preceding section. First, the public has little interest in
the private motion practice which attends discovery, even though the
relevant documents may be filed as public records; not even the
courthouse benchwarmers are likely to be aware of it. Second, the
nature of the relief sought, pertaining as it does simply ,to the proce-
dure which will govern further conduct of preliminary phases of the
litigation, is of a kind which, if the public has any thought at all
about it, is probably supposed to be the sole province of the bar
anyway.
3. The foundation necessagy to support an affldavit.
A second crucial distinction between the lawyer's testimony at
trial and attorneys' affidavits which has already been alluded to is
that the former must be limited to such facts as would be admissible
in evidence, while the latter may be filed-except in connection with
new trial and summary judgment motions-on information and be-
lief. This distinction is made necessary not only by the amorphous
character of the controversy in the preliminary stages of litigation,
but also by the crush of deadlines which loom up far more quickly
than the trial date itself; since the pretrial process is prepared to go
forward on the basis of an understanding which falls short of that
which percipient witnesses would provide, it seems to offer much less
justification for disabling counsel from assisting in informing that un-
derstanding. In cases where the lawyer's affidavit is made on infor-
mation and belief, the concern with the difficulty of attacking
counsel's credibility is substantially attenuated because the most ob-
vious faults with the attorney's account of things will arise not from
any doubts about his personal integrity or credibility, but simply
from the likelihood that he drew his conclusions on the basis of inad-
equate information or unfounded, though honest, belief.
In much the same way, the argument against counsel engaging in
the unseemly practice of arguing his own credibility is of far less mo-
ment when the focus of questions regarding credibility is removed
from the character of the witness to the more objective facts which
constitute the basis for his information and belief. Finally, if the so-
licitude for the image of the profession is bottomed on a fear that the
public will act adversely on its perception that lawyers are distorting
the truth in favor of their clients, that respect will probably be far less
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diminished if counsel has been forthright about the inherent instabil-
ity of any statement he makes.
4. The need for prompt action.
A final factor which distinguishes the attorney affidavit practice
from the lawyer's testimony at trial is the greater frequency with
which a party may be faced with quick demands for information to
support or oppose requests for relief in the preliminary stages of liti-
gation. Such necessity is and ought to be the mother of subvention in
the form of affidavits filed by counsel, at least where it can be shown
that any available alternatives would significantly delay the adjudi-
cation of an interlocutory motion. Disciplinary Rule 5-101(B)(4)
provides that counsel may act as both advocate and witness at trial
"if refusal would work substantial hardship on the client because of
the distinctive value of the lawyer or his firm as counsel in the partic-
ular case,""' and there are indications that it may properly be
applied where the need for confisel's testimony at trial arises sud-
denly." 6 The analogy is far from perfect, since the matter of finding
adequate substitute counsel becomes far harder as trial nears.
But whatever damage attorney testimony may cause, substitution
of counsel after the damage is done seems pointless. Even if it is un-
seemly for a lawyer to argue his own credibility, the unseemly effect
is not remedied by the substitution of a fresh lawyer once the argu-
ment has taken place. Similarly, any apprehension about role confu-
sion caused by the attorney acting as witness cannot be quieted
simply by leading the muddled attorney away after he has infected
court and opposing counsel with his bewilderment. And even if op-
posing counsel feels loathe to attack the testifying advocate (perhaps
out of fear the assault will be returned), that too may persist unless it
is clear before argument of the motion that the attorney-witness is
stepping out of the case.
Ill. THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE AND AFFIDAVITS OF
COUNSEL
A. Work Product Protection and Its Underpinnings
Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth
the essential rules for protection of materials prepared by parties,
their attorneys, and their agents in anticipation of litigation or for
115. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 5-101(B)(4).
116. See note 80 rupra and accompanying text.
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trial. 17 Under the rule, a party seeking discovery of such work prod-
uct must show both "substantial need of the materials in the prepara-
tion of his case" and an inability "without undue hardship to obtain
the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means."'18 If the
court ultimately orders discovery in response to such a showing, it
must protect against disclosure of the attorney's "mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories."' 19 While the rule is designed
to prevent harmful invasions of the attorney's private preparations
for trial, its scope does not extend beyond attempts to obtain discov-
ery of documents and other tangible things.
20
Although the rule does not take full account of the fact, different
types of information will by and large be more deserving of protec-
tion than others, and the justifications for applying the work product
rule will vary according to what information is sought. Different
principles may apply, for example, to a request for survey data pre-
pared in anticipation of litigation than would to a request for factual
117. The present rule was enacted as part of a general reorganization and amendment
of the discovery rules in 1970. For the background to these amendments, see Proposed Amend-
ments to the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure Relating to Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487. The amendments
were enacted by order of the United States Supreme Court in 1970. 398 U.S. 979 (1970).
The text of subsection (b)(3) reads in pertinent part: "[A] party may obtain discovery of
documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule
and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that
other party's representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or
agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the
materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of
such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against
disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or
other representative of a party concerning the litigation." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
The subsection goes on to excuse the required showing with regard to a demand by a
third person-party or witness-for a copy of a statement which that person made concern-
ing the action. Id.
For general discussions of work product, see Cooper, Work Product of the Rulesmakers, 53
MINN. L. REv. 1269 (1969); Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940,
1027-46 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Discovery Developments].
118. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); see note 117 supra.
119. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3); see note 117 supra.
120. When information concerning trial preparation is sought under other provisions of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-including Rule 30 (depositions upon oral examina-
tion), Rule 31 (depositions upon written questions), Rule 33 (interrogatories to parties), and
certain subsections of Rule 45 (subpoenas)-protection must be sought in the uncodified work
product doctrine of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), and the general protective pro-
visions of Rule 26(c). The latter gives federal judges the power, upon motion by any party
from whom discovery is sought, to "make any order which justice requires to protect a party
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense," including an or-
der "that certain matters not be inquired into, or that the scope of the discovery be limited in
certain matters." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
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information useful for impeaching one's own or the opposing party's
witnesses. Nonetheless there is value in canvassing in gross the argu-
ments in support of the work product doctrine before considering the
application of that notion in cases where counsel has filed an
affidavit.
The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 26(b)(3) summarizes the
four major justifications underlying attorney work product protec-
tion. 12 ' First and perhaps most intuitive is the belief that it would be
inherently unfair for one party automatically to have access to the
fruits of another party's preparatory labors,122 that a party, in effect,
has a proprietary interest in its work product.
A second notion, related to the first but more sophisticated, is
that elimination of work product protection would discourage pre-
trial preparation by all parties. 23 On the one hand, slothful attor-
neys would forego their own trial preparation, relying instead on
discovery of opposing counsel's trial preparation materials. On the
other hand, attorneys who would normally conduct thorough pre-
trial investigations would be discouraged from doing so, fearing that
they would merely be finding, memorializing, and ultimately re-
vealing holes in their own cases. 124 In the end, the presentation of
issues at trial would be insufficiently sharpened by the adversary sys-
tem to allow accurate and fair resolution of the controversy.
25
A third argument for the work product doctrine stresses the need
to protect attorneys from discovery of memoranda based on their rec-
121. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery, Advi-
sory Committee Note, 48 F.R.D. 487, 501. Onejustification advanced in the Advisory Com-
mittee Note to Rule 26(b)(3)-avoiding the danger of "sharp practices"--is not treated in
any depth in this article. Such "sharp practices" might range from simple deceit about what
had in fact been discovered, see Gardner, Agengy Problems in the Law of Attorne-Client Pivilege
Privilege and "Work Product" Under Open Discovery (pt. 2), 42 U. DET. L.J. 253, 269 (1965), to
"red herrings in the form of false statements or misleading briefs or memoranda.. . inserted
in the file for the purpose of misleading the opposition." Cleary, Hickman v. Jencks:Jwispru-
dence of the Adversar System, 14 VAND. L. REV. 865, 869 (1961). But as one commentator has
persuasively argued, "[t]he paucity of comment in this area reflects the lack of importance of
the anticipated danger of evasion, which of itself furnishes no more reason for limiting discov-
ery of trial preparation materials than any other kind of information." Cooper, supra note
117, at 1276.
122. See 48 F.R.D. at 501. A similar suggestion is made in Justice Jackson's concurring
opinion in Hickman: "Discovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform
its functions either without wits or on wits borrowed from the adversary." 329 U.S. at 516.
123. See 48 F.R.D. at 501.
124. See Sano Petroleum Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 3 F.R.D. 467, 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1944);
Gardner, supra note 121, at 271 n.300; Taine, Discoveray of Trial Preparations in the Federal Courts,
50 COLUM. L. REV. 1026, 1047 n.131 (1950); Discovery Developments, supra note 117, at 1029.
125. See Discovery Developments, supra note 117, at 1029.
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ollection of oral interviews. 126 The Supreme Court observed in Hick-
man v. Taylor127 that "[w]ere such materials open to opposing counsel
on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would
remain unwritten."'128 While this point is related to the general dan-
ger of inadequate preparation noted above, 129 Hickman warns more
specifically that discovery of counsel's notes of what a witness told
him could easily lead to the discovering party putting counsel on the
stand to force him to impeach his own witness, I30 a practice Justice
Jackson condemned as "out of professional character" for the
lawyer.'
3 1
A final justification for work product protection-and perhaps
the most difficult to define-is the need to shield from discovery each
side's informal evaluation of its case, 32 to protect what has been
called "hard-core" work product. 33 Although the Federal Rules do
not excuse withholding facts or legal theories, counsel's assessment of
the strength of his case, as well as his strategy for adducing proof at
trial-the questions to be put to witnesses, the order in which they
are to be called, the cases relied on as support for a legal conten-
tion-must be guarded to preserve a desirable element of surprise
and to prevent a discovering party from undertaking a point-by-
point obfuscation of its opponent's case.
3 .
126. See 48 F.R.D. at 502.
127. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
128. Id. at 511.
129. See text accompanying notes 123-24 supra.
130. "Under ordinary conditions, forcing an attorney to repeat or write out all that
witnesses have told him and to deliver the account to his adversary gives rise to grave dangers
of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness. No legitimate purpose is served by such production.
The practice forces the attorney to testify as to what he remembers or what he saw fit to write
down regarding witnesses' remarks. Such testimony could not qualify as evidence; and to use
it for impeachment or corroborative purposes would make the attorney much less an officer of
the court and much more an ordinary witness. The standards of the profession would thereby
suffer." 329 U.S. at 512-13.
131. Id. at 517.
132. See 48 F.R.D. at 501.
133. See Cooper, supra note 117, at 1283-301.
134. See id. The American Bar Association has provided a useful catalogue of the types
of information which would be protected under this rationale in civil trials: "notes or outlines
of trial strategy, of arguments to be made, of authorities to be cited, and of questions to be
asked witnesses; also memoranda between personnel in the office on legal questions, evidence,
prospective jurors, or other aspects of the case except medical, scientific, and experts' reports
• .., records of an attorney's travels with respect to a case; summaries and analyses of the
case file, evaluations of anticipated witnesses or their testimony; evaluations of the probabili-
ties of obtaining certain evidence; investigative sources and techniques." ABA PROJECT ON
MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND
PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL 91 (1969).
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B. Work Product Principles and Their Application to Attorney Afidavits
The kinds of affidavits counsel may file are numerous and varied,
and the considerations germane to the practice are correspondingly
complex. Beginning with one particular type of affidavit as an exam-
ple therefore may help focus an analysis of the affidavit practice in
the light of the traditional justifications of work product protection.
This section relies on the example of an affidavit signed and filed by
an attorney in support of a plaintiff's motion for a preliminary in-
junction. Let us suppose that the affidavit includes allegations based
on the attorney's information and belief, derived principally from an
interview the attorney has had with a key witness. The press of time
makes it impossible to secure the affidavit of the witness himself, but
the court grants the preliminary injunction anyway, relying solely, or
in part, on the attorney's affidavit. If the defendant then notices the
deposition of plaintiff's attorney, and requests in a subpoena duces
tecum that the attorney bring with him to the deposition all docu-
ments, memoranda, briefs, correspondence, and notes relevant to the
contentions in his affidavit, the question becomes whether and to
what extent the attorney has lost work product protection by filing
his affidavit.
As we will see in Part IV, we have already loaded the question a
bit by specifying a particular type of affidavit at a particular stage of
litigation: Certain elements peculiar to preliminary injunction mo-
tions may actually stand for variables in the calculus that Part IV
will recommend for determining the extent of work product waiver.
Nevertheless, when tested against the normal justifications for work
product, the affidavit in support of the injunction motion strongly
suggests that the attorney affidavit practice entails considerable work
product waiver.
1. The 'roprietary" claim for work product protection.
Unlike the other justifications for the work product doctrine, the
notion that a party has a proprietary right to its work product does
not look to the effect that granting discovery will have on the later
course of the litigation. It is at best a vague equitable argument, akin
to Aesop's fable of the grasshopper and the ant: Somehow it seems
unfair if "one side should. . . automatically have the benefit of the
detailed preparatory work of the other side."'1 35 This principle is un-
convincing even in cases where counsel has filed no affidavit, since it
defies the most elementary principle of discovery rules-that a party
135. 48 F.R.D. at 501.
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should not profit from its adversary's helpless ignorance.' 36 But even
if there is some life in the intuitive appeal of the proprietary princi-
ple, there seems equal and countervailing appeal in the idea that by
injecting his own perception of the facts into the litigation, and espe-
cially by securing affirmative relief on the basis of that perception,
counsel has secured just compensation for the appropriation of his
"property." Equally significant is the fact that the statement given
by the key witness to counsel may contain adverse evidence or im-
peachment material. Although any inaccuracies in the witness's ac-
count might be corrected at trial through cross-examination, that
possibility does not exist where the information has been filtered
through the attorney's affidavit. And the fact of outstanding injunc-
tive relief based on an inaccurate factual premise points toward per-
mitting the most rapid means available for ascertaining the whole
truth, even though that might entail discovery of counsel's notes.
These counter-arguments suggest no specific guidelines for work
product waiver, but they propel us into the more serious arguments
for work product protection with some momentum towards finding
waiver.
2. The trial preparation argument.
As noted above, the trial preparation argument has two facets:
Discovery of work product will tempt the lazy attorney to rely on his
opponent's preparation and discourage even the diligent attorney
from thorough pretrial investigation. 37 The first argument seems
questionable in any context. It hardly seems realistic to suppose that
an attorney would adopt a wait-and-see approach instead of trying to
conduct his own interview of a percipient witness. While counsel's
notes might contain some statements that could be used to discredit
his own witness, opposing counsel would be foolish to gamble on this
possibility; overriding incentives favor independent preparation. As
one commentator has observed, a party:
must know the facts as they are likely to appear at trial to make a
useful evaluation of the case for settlement and trial purposes, and
he will not risk trial without such preparation. Moreover, he will
be unwilling to let his adversary get to the witnesses first if this can
136. "The authors of the Federal Rules consequently intended to use discovery to re-
form the adversary system; they intended litigation to proceed with both sides in full posses-
sion of all facts and with each aware of the other's tactical strengths and weaknesses." W.
GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 30 (1968); see Cooper, supra
note 117, at 1274.
137. See notes 123-24 supra and accompanying text.
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be helped, since the first approach may give valuable psychological
advantage even where all parties are acting in good faith.1
3 8
If the opposing party fails to undertake independent investigation,
the reason is more likely to be "lack of means or opportunity than
a calculated choice to depend on disclosure of the adversary's
investigation."13 9
But the argument seems even weaker when one attorney files an
affidavit which enables him to obtain a preliminary injunction. So
long as courts limit discovery to materials supporting an attorney's
affidavit,"4 no opposing counsel could safely afford to gamble that
such an affidavit would actually be filed. And unless trial prepara-
tion materials generated by the attorney after entry of the court's
order would themselves lose protection by the filing of the prior affi-
davit, continued investigation by the plaintiff between the order and
trial would also counteract the tendency toward laziness in one who
had secured only part of his opponent's files.
Moreover, if the court has relied heavily on hearsay statements
recited in the attorney's affidavit, counsel for the enjoined party
should have the right to inspect the notes on which the affidavit (and
thus the relief) was based.14" ' Even when the extent of the attorney's
use of a witness's statement and the court's reliance on it are less
clear, discovery should still be permitted. The risk that injunctive
relief may ultimately be based on an inaccurate factual premise
points toward permitting the most rapid means available for ascer-
taining the facts, so as to prevent gratuitous harm to an unjustly en-
joined party.
142
The second facet of the trial preparation argument is that if the
opposition can obtain counsel's notes of an interview with a
percipient witness, counsel will be deterred from seeking such state-
ments, for fear of finding, memorializing, and revealing holes in his
own case. Once again, as noted above,"43 the risks involved are suffi-
ciently great that that fear is unlikely to deter investigation even in
138. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 206 (1965); see Cooper, supira note 117, at 1280.
139. F. JAMES, supra note 138, at 207.
140. See notes 183-86 infra and accompanying text.
141. Even if it cannot be shown affirmatively that the judge gave weight to the account
of the witness's statements given in the attorney's affidavit, the attorney's demonstrated belief
in its importance to the question of irreparable harm defeats any argument that protecting it
is necessary to ensure trial preparation.
142. Indeed, the whole case may ultimately hinge on grant or denial of the preliminary
injunction. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a) (2) ("IT]he court may order the trial of the action on the
merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the application [for a preliminary
injunction].").
143. See notes 138-39 supra and accompanying text.
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the ordinary case. But where the client would fear irreparable harm
if an injunction were not granted, a rule that counsel's notes of wit-
ness statements are fair game only after affirmative relief has been
secured is almost certain to have no deterrent effect.
If we are postulating a rule that the attorney's notes are discover-
able only after the attorney has employed them to get some affirma-
tive relief, the more difficult issue would seem to be whether counsel
has in fact "employed" the statements in securing interlocutory re-
lief. If the affidavit specifically sets out the statements it might be
reasonable to presume the question already answered, although even
there it would often be unclear whether the judge gave any weight to
such hearsay. But since the real question is preparation-deterrence,
inclusion in the affidavit itself indicates the attorney's belief that the
information bears importantly on the question of irreparable harm,
and for that reason ought to settle the matter. But if the affidavit
makes no specific reference to the statements the issue is slightly more
complex. The reason for failure to include may be one or more of
several: Fear of himself becoming a witness, irrelevance to the issue,
or even the fact that the statements point away from the relief being
sought. The first will be addressed below. But with respect to the
second and third, the preparation-deterrence question is clearly a
false one, since irreparable harm can be avoided before production
can be required. The attorney is unlikely to try to increase the
chances of victory at trial on the merits by avoiding discovery of un-
favorable evidence, when lack of preparation will correspondingly di-
minish the chance of success at the stage of preliminary relief, and
when the likelihood of having to turn over unfavorable information
anyway is modest. One might therefore suggest that the right of dis-
covery should turn on the fact that a preliminary injunction has been
issued, and not on the fact that counsel secured it in part by use of his
own affidavit. But the answer furnished by Rule 26(b)(3) seems
clear: If we start by accepting the trial preparation justification in the
ordinary run of cases, counsel's affidavit becomes the crux of the mat-
ter. For the rule requires a showing of "substantial need" and of
inability to obtain the "substantial equivalent of the materials by
other means." And the notes are "needed" precisely because it
is imperative to check the accuracy and credibility of counsel's
statement.
It might be argued that even if permitting a defendant to dis-
cover the plaintiff's attorney's notes would not deter investigation al-
together, it might encourage the plaintiff's attorney to omit
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recording facts favoring the other side. Again, this concern seems
illusory.
A party needs written statements signed by the witnesses to tie
them down to their early, presumably unrehearsed, versions of the
occurrence, and this purpose contemplates the possible use of a
statement at trial for impeachment purposes if a witness should
change his story. But if it appears at trial that the investigator
omitted from the statement unfavorable facts which the witness
told him, then the value of the statement is likely to be destroyed
and the investigator's side seriously prejudiced in the eyes of the
trier of fact. 1
And once again the marginal benefit of using undiscoverable written
notes to secure preliminary relief probably outweighs the cost of
thereafter having to turn over the notes to the other side.
3. The undesirability of attorneys serving as witnesses.
The third argument against discovery of work product holds that
if the plaintiff's attorney is forced to produce his recollection
(whether orally at his deposition or in the form of notes he has taken)
of the witness's statements to him, the witness's testimony at trial
might in many instances differ from the attorney's recollection. Forc-
ing the attorney to testify to the witness's prior inconsistent state-
ments would require him to choose between maintaining his own
credibility and furthering his client's interests.145 Such a choice
might undermine the client's confidence in the attorney's partisan-
ship, interrupt the attorney's control over the conduct of the case,
and relegate the attorney to the status of a participant.1
4 6
In any proceeding, a discovering attorney could bring his oppo-
nent's work product notes into evidence only by putting the opposing
attorney himself on the stand. The rules of evidence make an attor-
ney's notes of conversations with witnesses double hearsay that can
be used only if the attorney offers contradictory testimony on the
stand. 4 7 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit the use of an
144. F. JAMFs, supra note 138, at 206; see Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 129
(1968); Cooper, supra note 117, at 1277-78.
145. One commentator suggests that the ticklish problems raised by counsel's taking the
stand can often be resolved by a stipulation that counsel would have testified to a particular
fact. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 50, at 601[04]. The very infrequency with
which counsel actually is called to the stand, see United States v. Maloney, 241 F. Supp. 49
(W.D. Pa. 1965), indicates that such stipulations are common practice. Indeed, the dearth of
cases suggests that this argument for work product is generally weak.
146. Dircovery Developments, supra note 117, at 1029.
147. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 503(b) (1942); UNI-
FORM RULE OF EVIDENCE 801(d)(1).
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attorney's deposition only under similar limitations.'48 In any event,
the danger of the attorney being forced to take the stand flows natu-
rally from the rule that a party may discover notes of attorney inter-
views with witnesses by showing substantial need and the absence of
equivalent substitute materials. 4 9
The question, then, is whether this objection-which is really
only a qualified argument for work product-applies with even less
force when an attorney files an affidavit. The answer seems fairly
clear. First, even if the attorney who filed the affidavit is forced to
take the stand, his testimony is not likely to shake his client's confi-
dence in his loyalty to the client's case, since he has already demon-
strated that partisanship by taking the unusual step of filing an
affidavit, which-presumably-presented all facts in a light most
favorable to the client. Moreover, having gained the benefit of a pre-
liminary injunction on the basis of the affidavit, the client cannot
complain if its attorney is put on the stand at trial to tell the rest of
the story. Finally, the attorney who has filed an affidavit has little
reason to fear that he will be forced to choose between his own credi-
bility and that of the witnesses on whom he relied, when the latter
would be more beneficial to the client. This is not the ordinary case
of counsel and witness taking contradictory positions. The affidavit
presumably will be consistent with any testimony subsequently given
by the witnesses at trial. And the attorney can always minimize the
importance of or emphasize the ambiguity of his notes. This is not to
suggest that the self-interest of an attorney who has filed an affidavit
automatically coincides with the client's interest. Rather, the attor-
ney who participates in the case by filing an affidavit is likely to have
already addressed and reconciled any conflicts in credibility between
himself and his witnesses.
4. The need to shield trial strategy.
Professor Cooper has characterized this last justification for the
work product doctrine as the "hard-core" of an otherwise rather in-
substantial notion.1 50 Essentially it is that while under the revised
Federal Rules there is no excuse for withholding legal or factual con-
tentions, the method by which counsel intends to prove his case at
trial-the questions to be put to witnesses, the cases to be relied on as
support for a legal contention, the order in which witnesses are to be
148. See FED. R. CIv. P. 32(a)(1).
149. See notes 117-20 supra and accompanying text.
150. Cooper, supra note 117, at 1269.
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called, counsel's evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the
case-should be guarded in order to preserve a desirable element of
surprise and to prevent an adversary from undertaking a point-by-
point obfuscation at the proof-making stage. It should be clear that
the issue arises only in an indirect fashion with regard to statements
taken from witnesses. It is put most pointedly when discovery is
sought of an attorney's intraoffice memoranda outlining trial plans
and notes of legal research. Nonetheless it may well be an element in
our hypothetical if, for example, counsel's notes of statements made
by witnesses were interspersed with comments concerning their desir-
ability as witnesses, points to emphasize or soft-pedal at trial, case
references, or suggestions concerning the weight to be given a partic-
ular theory at trial. Rule 26(b)(3) indicates that "[i]n ordering dis-
covery of [trial preparation] materials when the required showing has
been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney
. . . ." And apparently the protection which is to be extended to
such information is intended to be absolute; if a particular document
is otherwise discoverable, hard-core work product should be excised
by the court after in camera review. 51 Perhaps the most difficult
question presented by the filing of an affidavit by an attorney is
whether the protection usually given hard-core work product is
thereby waived.
The nonabsolute character of "hard-core" work product. Despite the ap-
parently absolute prohibition in Rule 26 against disclosure of coun-
sel's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, and legal theories, it
is fairly well established that the protection may be lost in several
types of cases. Most obviously, protection should be waived when an
attorney is actively involved in the transaction at issue in the litiga-
tion, and seeks to withhold documents dealing with his activities.
52
151. Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730, 736 (4th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 997 (1975); Xerox Corp. v. I.B.M., 64 F.R.D. 367, 381
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Clower v. Walters, 51 F.R.D. 288, 289 (S.D. Ala. 1970); 8 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, su/ira note 9, at § 2026.
152. See 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 15, 26.64[4], at 26-447; cf. Bour-
get v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 48 F.R.D. 29 (D. Conn. 1969) (attorney for insurance
company, which failed to settle within policy limits, had information bearing on bad faith
and recklessness); LaRocca v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 47 F.R.D. 278 (W.D. Pa. 1969)
(attorney for insurance company which failed to settle within policy limits subject to discov-
ery; file of plaintiff's attorney in former action not discoverable); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v.
Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Wis. 1969) (counsel purportedly involved in
fraud on patent office, a defense to infringement action); Kirkland v. Morton Salt Co., 46
F.R.D. 28 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (malicious use of process in former action); Rekeweg v. Federal
Mut. Ins. Co., 27 F.R.D. 431 (N.D. Ind. 1961) (action against attorney for failure to sue
[Vol. 31:191
ATTORNEY AFFIDAVITS
Related issues frequently arise in cases where discovery is sought
from an attorney who is an officer or director of a corporate party.15
3
But it is difficult to apply such cases straightforwardly to the affidavit
practice, since the mere filing of an affidavit involves the attorney
not as performer but as witness who might not have first-hand
information.
A second class of cases recognizing a waiver of otherwise absolute
protection encompasses situations in which the attorney has disclosed
work product information to third persons who stand in an adver-
sarial relation to the attorney's client. The explicit language of Rule
26(b)(3) would foreclose any waiver argument where the person to
whom disclosure is made may be considered an agent of counsel or
his client, and cases decided even before the 1970 amendments recog-
nized the need for communication between an attorney and persons
with whom he was aligned in interest.1 4 For the same reason, protec-
tion is most often afforded to communications between attorneys for
coparties.' But when disclosure is made under circumstances which
make it likely that the information will fall into the hands of an op-
posing party, protection is said to be waived. The explanation is, of
course, obvious: If the function to be served by this qualified immu-
nity from discovery is the preservation of some element of spontane-
ity and surprise in the presentation and argument of cases at trial,
disclosure will either indicate that the attorney who might claim the
privilege thinks the information unimportant to his trial strategy, or
mean that the purposes of the rule can no longer be served by
nondiscoverability.
The relevance of these cases to the attorney's affidavit is obvious,
although their implications for increased discoverability are limited.
Revelation of mental impressions, opinions, conclusions, and theories
within statute of limitations); Gulf Constr. Co. v. St. Joe Paper Co., 24 F.R.D. 411 (S.D. Tex.
1959) (attorney involved in process of mitigating damages).
153. See Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 979 (E.D.
Wis. 1969) (production of documents ordered even though they involved activities of counsel
both inside and outside corporate structure); Smith v. Bentley, 9 F.R.D. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1949)
(position as officer or director in itself is not enough); Stone v. Grayson Shops, Inc., 8 F.R.D.
101 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (discoverability depends on capacity in which attorney was acting when
he received the information; in this case discoverable even if acting as attorney).
154. See, e.g., Natta v. Zletz, 418 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1969) (communications between
outside and house patent counsel; communications between counsel and retained expert).
155. Set, e.g., Smith v. Bentley, 9 F.R.D. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). Ste generaly 4 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACrICE, supra note 15, 26.64[4], at 26-447 & n.16; 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,




in an affidavit indicates--even more obviously than does disclosure
to a third person-a waiver of the privilege as to the information
disclosed, since a copy of the affidavit is served on opposing coun-
sel.' 6 But it is difficult to infer from that disclosure a right to go
behind the affidavit to supporting materials and thoughts: To the
extent that hard-core work product contained in such form remains
obscure after service of the affidavit, it is difficult to say that the at-
torney-affiant thinks it unimportant to trial strategy, or that the pur-
poses of the rule can no longer be served by nondiscoverability.
The '"rior use" exception. Although the Supreme Court has not
considered the question in connection with genuine hard-core work
product, it indicated in United States v. Nobles '5 that a party may lose
protection of other trial preparation materials once it makes "testi-
monial use" of them in the course of litigation. Nobles was tried for
armed robbery of a federally insured bank, and at trial attempted to
impeach two prosecution witnesses by offering the testimony of an
investigator to whom they had made statements. The essence of
those conversations was preserved in the investigator's written report,
which the district court ordered produced as a condition of the inves-
tigator's testifying. When Nobles's counsel declined to produce the
report, the court refused to permit the investigator to testify. Nobles
was convicted, and the Supreme Court ultimately held that produc-
tion was properly made a condition of the investigator's testifying.
Although the issue arose in the context of a criminal trial, the
Court recognized that the work product doctrine "applies to criminal
litigation as well as civil."' 8 And as is true in civil actions under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), the Court noted that the
doctrine protects material prepared by agents for the attorney as well
as those prepared by the attorney himself. Nor does the protection
dissipate once trial is begun, since "[d]isclosure of an attorney's ef-
forts at trial, as surely as disclosure during pretrial discovery, could
disrupt the orderly development and presentation of his case."15 9
Whatever might otherwise be the case, however, "where. . .counsel
attempts to make a testimonial use of these [work product] materials
the normal rules of evidence come into play with respect to cross-
156. See FED. R. Civ. P. 5(a).
157. 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
158. Id. at 236. Where discovery is sought by the defendant from the prosecution in a
criminal case, of course, the question is a bit muddied by the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500
(1976).
159. 422 U.S. at 239.
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examination and production of documents."' 6
It should not be supposed that by use of the phrase "testimonial
use" the Court meant to indicate that waiver attaches only when the
materials themselves are introduced in evidence. In fact, the only
actual evidentiary use made of the investigator's notes occurred when
they were shown to one of the prosecution witnesses to refresh his
recollection of his conversation with the investigator; 6 and that
alone was not enough to trigger disclosure of any remaining relevant
material. Nor was there any indication that the investigator had re-
ferred to the notes or would refer to them on the stand as past recol-
lection recorded or as refreshment of present recollection. Rather,
what the Court seems to have had in mind was merely the fact that
once the investigator had testified, they would become relevant to the
subject matter of his direct examination.
Respondent can no more advance the work-product doctrine to
sustain a unilateral testimonial use of work-product materials than
he could elect to testify in his own behalf and thereafter assert his
Fifth Amendment privilege to resist cross-examination on matters
reasonably related to those brought out in direct examination.'
62
The reasons for ordering disclosure in those circumstances are fairly
obvious. The very notion of cross-examination presumes that the
witness may present simply half-truths; the role of opposing counsel
is then to discover and present the remaining and qualifying circum-
stances concerning the subject of testimony, and the facts which di-
minish the personal trustworthiness of the witness. And while both
elements may be supplied from other sources, there is no equally ef-
fective substitute for having the witness supply his own refutation
immediately following his direct examination.163 Thus the investiga-
tor's report becomes testimonial material once he has taken the stand
in the obvious sense that it then is evidence, which can be employed by
160. Id. at n. 14. Conclusions similar to that reached by the Court in Nobles have been
arrived at by a number of lower courts in civil actions where a member of the litigation
team-generally an investigator rather than the attorney-took pictures or made a contem-
poraneous report on material evidence (the scene of an accident, the car involved, etc.) which
is no longer available in the same form. Cummings v. Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.R.D. 373 (E.D. Pa.
1968); Parrett v. Ford Motor Co., 47 F.R.D. 22 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Maginnis v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 207 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. La. 1962); Marks v. Gas Serv. Co., 168 F. Supp. 487
(W.D. Mo. 1958); Julius Hyman & Co. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 17 F.R.D. 22 (W.D.
Mo. 1958).
161. 422 U.S. at 228.
162. Id. at 239-40.
163. 5 J. WIGMONRE, supra note 1, § 1368.
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the other side for impeachment and perhaps substantive purposes.'6
The issue raised by the hypothetical we are considering differs
from the question dealt with in Nobles in several important respects.
Most obviously, the materials sought by the prosecution in that case
were produced by an investigator working for the defendant's coun-
sel, rather than by counsel himself. As Justice White noted in his
concurring opinion in Nobles, the latter case provokes a consideration
of "whether the policies against putting in issue the credibility of the
lawyer who will sum up to the jury outweigh the jury's interest in
obtaining all relevant information."' 165 But as was developed above,
there are substantial reasons for striking that balance in favor of the
jury's interest once the attorney has already entered the lists as an
affiant.
An even more significant point is that Nobles -contains no-indica-
tion that the investigator's notes would have revealed in any way
what we have called hard-core work product-the mental impres-
sions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of counsel. The only ref-
erence which the Court made to materials of that kind was a terse
indication that when counsel uses his own materials to prepare the
case and to examine witnesses, "there normally is no waiver." 66 But
the advocate's use of materials in the presentation of a case from the
outside, as it were, is clearly different from the hypothetical we are
considering, where the attorney-affiant steps in as participant. How-
ever much his notes may discredit his own witnesses in the former
case, it is only in the latter situation that they take on the unique
characteristic which made Nobles's investigator's notes discoverable:
Only then can they be used to discredit a witness-the lawyer--out
of his own mouth.
Suppose, by way of illustration, that counsel's affidavit in support
of a motion for a preliminary injunction contains an allegation on
information and belief--derived from his interview with a witness
unavailable at the moment-that irreparable harm is likely to occur
if the relief is not granted. The argument being made here is that the
opposing party should be entitled to assess the significance not only
of the statements made by the witness which have found their way
onto counsel's legal pad (which are not hard-core work product), but
also of counsel's reaction to those statements, including interlinea-
tions and marginal comments regarding the desirability of the
164. See 422 U.S. at 245-51 (White, J., concurring); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,
511 (1947).
165. 422 U.S. at 253.
166. Id. at 239 n.14. See also id. at 252-54 (White, J., concurring).
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speaker as a witness, points to emphasize or down-play at trial, and
suggestions concerning the weight to be given a particular theory at
trial. The reason is that the issue posed by the affidavit is whether
the attorney has drawn proper conclusions and given a believable
prediction (about irreparable injury) based on the first-hand account
of which he was the only auditor. Put another way, we want to know
whether the sources of the attorney's information and the grounds for
his belief were credible and substantial, and because the attorney was
the only person present at the disclosure of the information, his reac-
tion to it is the most important bit of evidence for making that
determination. 167
IV. ATTORNEY AFFIDAVITS AND WORK PRODUCT: A SCHEME
FOR DETERMINING WAIVER
Part III addressed the justifications for work product protection
in the context of an attorney affidavit filed in support of a motion for
interlocutory injunctive relief. While the example of the preliminary
injunction raises most of the relevant issues, the particular character
of an injunction motion disguises a number of variables unique to
167. Considerations similar to those advanced in this section could well lead to waiver
of any work product protection for materials used to refresh the recollection of a witness.
Federal Rule of Evidence 612 provides that "an adverse party is entitled to have" a writing
used to refresh the memory of a witness while testifying, and that the court in its discretion
may order production of writings used to refresh the witness's recollection before testifying.
Rule 612 is to be interpreted in light of Rule 501, which acknowledges the existence of privi-
leges governed by the Constitution, acts of Congress, and rules prescribed by the Supreme
Court, as well as those rooted in the principles of the common law. FED. R. EvID. 501; 3 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 50, at 612[04]. The issue would be whether the
protection provided by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) and by what can only be
called its common law analogue for nondocumentary materials, see Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. at 512 ("the general policy against invading the privacy of an attorney's course of prepa-
ration is so well recognized and so essential to an orderly working of our system of legal
procedure that a burden rests on the one who would invade that privacy to establish ade-
quate reasons to justify production through a subpoena or court order."); id. at 514 ("When
Rule 26 and the other discovery rules were adopted, this Court and the members of the bar in
general certainly did not believe or contemplate that all the files and mental processes of
lawyers were thereby opened to the free scrutiny of their adversaries.'), overrides the policy of
FED. R. EVID. 612. At least one commentator has suggested that the rule should eliminate
any available work product protection. Comment, Witnesses Under Article VI of the Protosed
FederalRules of Evidence, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1236, 1274 (1969). The requirement of disclosure
of refreshment materials is based on the danger that they will be palmed off to the jury as the
witness's present recital of the event in question, when in fact he has no recollection at all, and
the opportunity that they offer to demonstrate that the witness's recollection, already once
drawn into question, is faulty. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 9, at 17 (2d ed. 1972); 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1i § 762, at 138-39. In both regards the
material is essential to effective cross-examination, and hence shares the quality which it was
urged in text made the attorney-affiant's work product discoverable.
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other types of attorney affidavits-those employed to verify plead-
ings, to assist in the discovery process, to seek or oppose complete or
partial summary judgment, or to secure or defeat the grant of a new
trial. The discovering party's need for the information is a prerequi-
site to disclosure under Rule 26(b)(3), and by extension, under the
more undefined work product doctrine applicable to nondocumen-
tary information.' 68 This need obviously may vary with the type of
order which counsel's affidavit helps secure. A second element in the
work product analysis which may change as the litigation progresses
is the foundation required to support any statement which an attor-
ney may make under oath. Though information and belief may suf-
fice at more preliminary stages, 169 first-hand knowledge is required
for applications for summary judgment and for new trial.170 A third
variable-one whose relevance depends not on the stage at which an
affidavit is offered but on the justification advanced for protecting
work product-is the extent to which the court has relied on coun-
sel's statement in issuing or refusing a requested order.
Applying these criteria helps determine whether a particular affi-
davit works a waiver of work product protection. But two questions
then remain, which this part also tries to resolve: If disclosure of work
product is to be ordered, what should be its scope? And is there a
duty imposed on the attorney to release after-acquired work product
once the initial disclosure has been ordered?
A. The Type of Relief Secured
The form of relief an attorney seeks and secures by filing an affi-
davit is perhaps the crucial factor in applying virtually all the con-
ventional arguments for protecting work product. Verifying a
pleading, because it never even temporarily resolves either substan-
tive or procedural disagreements between the parties, should not
cause a waiver of normal work product protection.17 1 On the other
168. See note 120 supra and accompanying text.
169. See FED. R. Civ. P. II.
170. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
171. Thus the "proprietary" argument is strongest when the attorney filing the affidavit
has secured no relief against the opposing party. Similarly, if we assume that trial prepara-
tion will suffer if disclosure is ordered, there is good reason to believe that any lawyer worth
his salt will put his client to the trouble of verifying the pleadings rather than risk losing the
benefits of his own discovery. But forcing attorney and client to run that inconvenience is
precisely what statutes authorizing verification are designed to avoid. Finally, if attorney-
client relations really do suffer when the attorney is forced to take the stand, see notes 145-46
supra and accompanying text, it is likely to be of small moment to the client that the attorney
verified a pleading and risked being put on the stand just to save the client a trip into the next
county to sign a complaint.
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hand, in the example of the motion for a preliminary injunction we
assumed that because the defendant was subjected to the hardship of
a temporary injunction, he should be permitted to penetrate the
work product materials relevant to the plaintiff attorney's affidavit.
We still must consider whether work product is waived by the filing
of an affidavit in the other typical situations--discovery motions,
summary judgment, and motions for a new trial.
The extraordinary range of relief available at the discovery
stage 172 makes it difficult to generalize about affidavits at this point
in the litigation. Since the varieties of relief dispositive of the litiga-
tion will be considered below, it may be most instructive to deal sim-
ply with a case where counsel for the plaintiff has filed his own
affidavit in support of a motion to expedite discovery on the basis of
his view of the merits.
If the proprietary argument for work product protection has any
validity, it is more persuasive here than it would be in the case of a
motion for a preliminary injunction. An order granting expedited
discovery does not directly affect the parties' liabilities outside the
litigation process. Moreover, the order would most likely be even-
handed, directing that the parties proceed with discovery at the same
pace.
The relevance of the trial preparation argument to an order to
expedite discovery is a closer question. A party's need for expedited
discovery may be great enough to overcome any fear that it will
waive work product protection if its counsel files an affidavit. On the
other hand, one can easily imagine cases where the urgency of discov-
ery might not be quite so pressing. In such a case, the disclosure of
work product might well work as a disincentive to preparation. Thus
if we are to presume that this argument has real empirical merit (an
assumption which Part III suggested might be unwarranted), the
court should assess in each case the chance of discouraging future
preparation, given the need of the moving party for the relief sought.
As for the danger that the responding party will call the moving
counsel to the stand, by the time of a preliminary discovery motion
counsel has usually gathered too little information to become a useful
172. Where a party fails to comply with discovery the Federal Rules provide sanctions
ranging from a simple stay of further proceedings to dismissal of the action or default judg-
ment. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b). Judicial orders are available for an almost endless variety of
other purposes. See, e.g., note 11 Isupra and accompanying text. Counsel could presumably file




trial witness for the opposition, even if he were required to turn over
work product materials. This fact, of course, speaks in favor of dis-
closure and against the danger of the responding party requiring
counsel to testify. Further, as we saw earlier, before filing an affida-
vit counsel will normally have resolved any potential conflicts be-
tween his statements and the likely testimony of his witnesses.173 But
if there is any persuasive force to the claim that attorney-client rela-
tions might be strained if counsel is forced to take the stand, it may
well be that the client is no more kindly disposed toward that predic-
ament simply because his lawyer earlier succeeded in expediting
discovery.1
74
Finally, whatever arguments favor discovery of general work
product, hard-core work product merits more protection after affida-
vits filed at the discovery stage. In contrast to preliminary injunctive
relief, expedited discovery creates considerably less need for cross-
checking the affiant-attorney's private evaluation of the merits. The
hardship to the party losing the motion is greatly diminished in the
latter case, and probably insufficient to warrant exposing the oppo-
nent's trial strategy for which Rule 26(b)(3) shows such solicitous
regard.
A grant of summary judgment obviously entails even more dras-
tic consequences for the responding party than an interlocutory in-
junction. Thus, to the extent that affidavits of counsel help secure
summary judgment, the court should incline all the more toward
finding waiver of work product protection in this situation. If sum-
mary judgment warrants analysis different from that we have given
injunctions, we must look to the differing foundations required of
attorney affidavits in these two situations.
75
The application of the work product arguments to motions for a
new trial is more complicated. As we have seen, the attorney filing
such a motion will typically seek to support it with extra-record facts,
such as newly discovered evidence, facts showing jury misconduct, or
misconduct of the opposing party or counsel outside the courtroom.
As in the case of summary judgment, counsel's affidavit could play
no part in determining the merits of the motion unless his statement
would be admissible at trial.
176
173. See text accompanying note 149 supra.
174. The client's reaction naturally will depend on a number of other factors, including
his sophistication and the actual urgency of early discovery.
175. See text accompanying notes 181-82 infra.
176. The issues on a motion for new trial are thus different from those that arise when
work product discovery is sought in subsequent litigation. Cf. Duplan Corp. v. Moulinage et
Retorderie de Chavonoz, 487 F.2d 480, 485 (4th Cir. 1973) (production of work product
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Suppose that shortly after losing a verdict in an aircraft collision
case plaintiff's counsel obtains from a private detective a flight log
suggesting that defendant's craft departed from its flight plan shortly
before the collision. On a motion for a new trial counsel files an
affidavit identifying the document and stating that counsel over-
heard defendant, while leaving-the courtroom, say to his lawyer, "It's
a good thing they didn't know the altimeter was broken." In connec-
tion with the motion defendant seeks disclosure of all documents in
plaintiff's counsel's possession relevant to the new evidence and the
use counsel would make of it at a new trial. 1 7 7 The issue is whether
the defendant is entitled to obtain, for example, a copy of a memo-
randum in counsel's file stating that "the most serious obstacle to our
motion, if it should come out, is the fact that the air traffic controller
told me yesterday that defendant was not out of his flight plan. He
may only have thought so because his altimeter was broken, and
have recorded that inaccurate fact in the log."
The proprietary argument for work product protection is as weak
here as it is at the preliminary injunction stage. Whatever proprie-
tary claim plaintiff's counsel might assert to the facts he learned from
the traffic controller, that right surely does not entitle him to over-
turn the defendant's verdict on the basis of his own affidavit, when
that affidavit may be inconsistent with the supposedly proprietary
facts.
The trial preparation argument for work product preparation is
no more persuasive. Having already lost the case, and having at the
outset only the slenderest chance of succeeding on a motion for a new
materials prepared in prior unrelated case ordered only if "substantial need and undue hard-
ship" shown); Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117 (M.D. Pa. 1970) (discov-
ery of documents relating to prior cases allowed where prior cases no longer pending,
defendants not parties to those actions, and no indication documents prepared "with an eye
toward [this] litigation"); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 207 F. Supp. 407
(M.D. Pa. 1962) (production ordered of counsel's memorandum prepared at meeting regard-
ing prior suit where contents could not be learned from anyone else and defendant sought to
confront plaintiff with contents at trial without allowing plaintiff chance to consider legal
ramifications of statement made at meeting); Note, Discovery of an Attornry5 Work Product in
Subsequent Litigation, 1974 DUKE L.J. 799; Discovery Developments, supra note 117, at 1044.
177. Cf Edgar v. Finley, 312 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1963) (court improperly sustained
plaintiff's objections to interrogatories on basis of privilege even though information re-
quested was furnished to defendant's attorney in confidence); N.Y. COUNTY LAWYERS' Asso-
CIATION, COMMITEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 64 (1915), reiinted in
OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEES ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND THE NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION
547 (1956) (plaintiff's attorney may testify about matters voluntarily admitted during meet-
ing with defendants, but should withdraw as trial counsel if he does so).
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trial,178 plaintiff's counsel will certainly spare no effort to uncover
favorable new evidence. While the improbability of plaintiff suc-
ceeding on a new trial motion, coupled with the possibility of getting
a look at plaintiff's counsel's file, may induce the victorious defend-
ant to be less diligent than usual in trial preparation, that danger
seems negligible compared to that of an unfair verdict based on pos-
sibly inaccurate information. Moreover, by filing an affidavit on
first-hand knowledge, counsel has chosen to become a full-fledged
witness in any evidentiary hearing that might be held. Any tension
between his roles as litigator and witness is entirely of his own mak-
ing. Even with regard to hard-core work product counsel would
probably be in no better position regarding his notes than was the
investigator in Nobles'79 regarding his written report. Since counsel
has made a "testimonial use" of his work product, it is subject to the
normal rules of evidence.' 80
B. The Foundation Required to Support Counsel's Affidavit
We have seen that affidavits filed in connection with verification
of pleadings, discovery, or motions for interlocutory injunctive relief
may be made on information and belief rather than on first-hand
knowledge,' 8 ' while those considered on summary judgment or new
trial motions must contain such matter as would be admissible in
evidence. 82 This difference in the foundation required to support
counsel's affidavit will affect the protection which work product de-
serves once the affidavit is filed. As the discussion of United States v.
Nobles in Part III indicated, once an attorney has filed an affidavit,
even hard-core work product may lose protection if the opposing
party needs it for cross-examination at trial. What is more, protection
may be lost whether counsel's affidavit is filed on information and
belief or on personal knowledge. But there is one critical difference
between the two cases. The justification for discovery where infor-
mation and belief provided the foundation was the need to assess the
credibility and persuasiveness of a witness statement which counsel
178. See, e.g., Trans Miss. Corp. v. United States, 494 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1974) (evidence
which is merely cumulative or impeaching does not generally warrant new trial); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Lawrenson, 334 F.2d 464, 466 (4th Cir.), cer. denied, 379 U.S.
869 (1964) (evidence which has previously been offered or is merely cumulative or impeach-
ing is not new evidence); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 691 (2d. ed. 1977); 11
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, at § 2859.
179. 422 U.S. at 239 n.14.
180. See notes 160-64 supra and accompanying text.
181. See notes 169-70 supra and accompanying text.
182. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
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was the only person to hear. It thus became important to probe the
lawyer's own mental impressions insofar as they related to those
issues.
But once the witness himself becomes available, the attorney's
mental impressions-indeed his affidavit itself-become superfluous.
If the court which issued the preliminary injunction concluded that
irreparable injury was likely on the basis of what the witness told
counsel, both judge and opposing party can now reopen the matter
with a first-hand-rather than hearsay-account.
On the other hand, in those cases where counsel has filed an affi-
davit based on personal knowledge, there will never come a point
when what he has said becomes superfluous. When the court grants
injunctive relief, denies partial summary judgment, or denies a new
trial on the basis of counsel's first-hand statement, it will always be
true that the most effective means of overturning the court's order
will be to disprove counsel's claim out of his own mouth.
C. The Court's Reliance on the Affidavit
The third variable affecting work product protection is the extent
to which the court has actually relied on counsel's affidavit in decid-
ing to grant relief, regardless of the particular type of relief secured.
The reliance factor does not bear equally on all the traditional argu-
ments for work product protection. The danger of discouraging trial
preparation, for example, varies not so much with the use the court
ultimately makes of the affidavit as with the lawyer's sense of the
urgency of gathering information. But the extent of the court's reli-
ance on the affidavit certainly helps determine the danger of the affi-
ant-attorney being called to the witness stand, since the greater the
reliance, the more likely the opposing party will see it in its interest to
examine the affiant. Unlike the proprietary and hard-core argu-
ments, the claim against discovery based on the attorney-as-witness
argument thus varies directly-rather than inversely -with the
court's reliance. Since the intuitive sense that it is unfair to obtain
another party's work product depends heavily on the question
whether the owner of the work product has put it to great use in
litigation, a showing of stronger reliance diminishes the force of the
proprietary argument. Finally, to the extent that the court has relied
on the affiant's personal evaluation of facts, the affiant may have
waived even hard-core work product protection, since the need for
cross-checking the accuracy of counsel's claims grows with the size of
the part they play in the grant or denial of serious affirmative relief.
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The reliance element obviously differs from the other variables in
that the judge will in a sense have to examine his own thinking to
measure it in a particular case. But it is well to reiterate that where
the court does rely on counsel's affidavit, it is not only those matters
which support the statements made which may be discovered. Even
more crucial is the right to inspect what counsel omitted, so long as it
relates to the subject matter of the affidavit.
D. The Scope of Disclosure
As noted above, work product discovery hinges on showings
of "substantial need" and inability to obtain the "substantial
equivalent" of the information sought.13 Once the criteria discussed
above-the type of relief secured, the foundation required for the af-
fidavit, and the court's reliance on the affidavit-determine whether
work product protection is waived, these requirements also serve as
benchmarks for determining the scope of work product discovery.
The "need" and "equivalence" test contrasts with the normal test for
discovery set forth in Rule 26(b)(1): "relevan[ce] to the subject mat-
ter.' 84 The practical consequence of this difference should be to al-
low discovery of any information bearing on the accuracy and
completeness of statements made in counsel's affidavit and relied
upon by a court in granting relief. In other words, the scope of dis-
covery in such cases should be as wide as the scope of cross-examina-
tion. "'85 This is the only certain way to avoid the unilateral
"testimonial use of [work product] materials" condemned in
Nobles.' 86 Under this rule, hard-core work product requires no spe-
cial treatment. Once the accuracy of the attorney's perception and
the truth of his statement, or the source of his information and
grounds for his belief, are put in issue-as they must be by an affida-
vit-no special concern ought to attach to his mental impressions or
personal evaluation of the case.
E. Disclosure of After-acquired Work Product
A final question is whether the affiant-attorney has a continuing
responsibility to disclose work product, after the initial required dis-
closure. The example of the preliminary injunction in Part III sug-
gests the need for such a duty. Suppose that in issuing the injunction
the court makes clear its heavy reliance on the hearsay statements set
183. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); see notes 118-20 supra and accompanying text.
184. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
185. See FED. R. EVID. 611(b).
186. 422 U.S. at 239 n.14; see notes 158-64 supra and accompanying text.
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forth in counsel's affidavit. If several weeks later, after interviewing
other witnesses, counsel decides that the original statements were in-
accurate and therefore does not intend to press their accuracy at
trial, the grant of injunctive relief based on the court's reliance on the
attorney's affidavit constitutes the enjoined party's "substantial
need" for such information.
Although it does not directly address the problem, Rule 26(e)
provides a useful definition of the circumstances under which disclo-
sure of after-acquired work product should be made:
A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if
he obtains information upon the basis of which (A) he knows that
the response was incorrect when made, or (B) he knows that the
response though correct when made is no longer true and the cir-
cumstances are such that a failure to amend the response is in sub-
stance a knowing concealment.
18 7
The reason for restricting the duty of supplementation to parties
is that nonparty witnesses will seldom be familiar enough with the
facts and issues of the litigation to know whether after-acquired in-
formation is material to the litigation. 88 Moreover, the Federal
Rules may seek to avoid burdening those whose only involvement in
the case stems from their fulfillment of a public duty to provide evi-
dence in their possession.
Counsel fits neither of those descriptions. Rule 26(e) does not ex-
plicitly apply to counsel because the work product and attorney-
client protections make discovery from counsel an extraordinary
event.' 89 But once work product protection is lost there is little rea-
son to restrict disclosure to materials and information which are in
counsel's possession at the time the affidavit is filed.
V. CONCLUSION
Although trial attorneys commonly file affidavits in connection
with litigation in which they are involved, little thought has been
given to the circumstances which make such active participation de-
sirable or proper, and to the consequences which it may have for the
187. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2). The rule speaks only of parties. Discovery of work prod-
uct, on the other hand, would be made either by taking the deposition of the attorney, or
serving him with a subpoena duces tecun pursuant to FED. R. Crv. P. 45.
188. For an analysis of the circumstances in which courts compel disclosure of after-
acquired work product, see 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 2049, at 324.
189. Of equal importance, perhaps, is the simple fact that even contentions and conclu-
sions of counsel, in addition to facts and theories, may be secured by serving the party with
interrogatories, FED. R. Crv. P. 33(b), or requests for admissions, FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a).
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discovery process. This article has attempted to suggest that the ethi-
cal concerns which attend lawyers' testimony at trial apply with con-
siderably less force to statements under oath made during more
preliminary stages of a lawsuit. Whether the arguments generally
advanced against taking the stand apply at all is a matter which de-
pends on several factors: the extent to which the attorney's affidavit
draws him into disputed issues close to the merits, the type of relief
sought by a motion supported by counsel's affidavit, the foundation
required to support counsel's statement, which may range from infor-
mation and belief to personal knowledge, and the relative need for
prompt action which moves the attorney to dispense with alternate
sources of proof.
The latter half of this essay discussed the question whether coun-
sel, by making his own statement under oath regarding the merits of
the controversy, has waived the protection generally given to work
product. There again it is argued that the underpinnings of tradi-
tional doctrine do not support a rule of nondisclosure with nearly the
same strength once an affidavit has been filed. Whether the protec-
tion is waived again depends on several factors: the type of relief se-
cured, the foundation required to support counsel's affidavit, and the
extent to which the court relied on the attorney's statement in issuing
or refusing a requested order. Where disclosure is appropriate, its
scope should be as wide as that usually permitted for cross-examina-
tion, and there should be a duty imposed on counsel to release after-
acquired work product falling within that range.
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